The Irrational Actor in the CEO Suite: Implications for Corporate Governance by Jones, Renee M.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
6-1-2017
The Irrational Actor in the CEO Suite: Implications
for Corporate Governance
Renee M. Jones
Boston College Law School, renee.jones.2@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Law and
Psychology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Renee M. Jones. "The Irrational Actor in the CEO Suite: Implications for Corporate Governance." Delaware Journal of Corporate Law
41, no.3 (2017): 713-762.
THE IRRATIONAL ACTOR IN THE CEO SUITE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 




This Article challenges corporate governance theorists’ standard 
assumptions regarding the rationality of business leaders.  It reviews 
scholarly research that documents the presence of irrational actors 
among senior corporate managers and considers the impact these 
executives might have on corporations and society. The Article focuses 
analysis on psychological literature that explores why risk-related 
decision-making often goes wrong.  
Research shows that many individuals have a dysfunctional 
approach to risk that leads them to engage in self-destructive conduct.  A 
non-trivial number of individuals with problematic personality traits 
work at high levels of major corporations where they have the capacity 
to cause significant harm. This reality poses challenges for policy 
prescriptions based on the rational actor theory – the idea that laws 
should be designed to harness an individual’s propensity to act in his 
rational self-interest. 
 One potential danger is that policies that promote the pursuit of 
self-interest have the unintended effect of attracting individuals with 
antisocial traits to join the corporate workforce. Another concern is that 
policies that emphasize self-interest may exacerbate antisocial 
tendencies among corporate employees, leading to increasingly risky 
and unethical corporate conduct.  The Article weighs these possibilities 
and offers recommendations for reform.  
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What is the point of corporate law?  One way of answering this 
question is that corporate and financial laws were designed to curb self-
interested, short-sighted, and impulsive conduct in order to protect and 
preserve the wealth of those who contribute to the corporate enterprise.  
If we think carefully about what these laws require we can see some of 
the mechanisms the law employs to achieve these ends.   
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The cornerstones of traditional state corporate law are the 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.  The duty of loyalty commands 
corporate officials to set aside self-interest when making corporate 
decisions.  The duty of care mandates that officers and directors manage 
corporate affairs responsibly; that they act with due consideration of the 
consequences of their decisions.  In this way, the duty of care proscribes 
impulsive or rash decision-making.  
Banking law similarly aims to discourage managers from taking 
ill-advised risks in pursuit of short-term gains.  For example, the Glass-
Steagall Act’s prohibition on investing in equity securities prevented 
banks from gambling with depositors’ money.  Lending restrictions, such 
as the limit on loans to a single borrower, forbid imprudent lending 
practices.1  In addition, minimum capital requirements provide 
prophylactic protection against excess risk taking by bank officials and 
fiduciary duties apply with equal (or greater) force under banking laws.  
Federal securities laws, which focus mainly on disclosure, impose 
obligations of candor and honesty on promoters seeking to attract money 
from investors.  
Overall, our corporate and financial laws aim to protect society 
from the consequences of extreme or reckless conduct by those entrusted 
to manage socially significant business institutions.  For years, this 
central understanding of the need for law – to push back against certain 
natural human tendencies (such as sloth, greed, and gluttony) – informed 
corporate and financial law analysis.  This traditional understanding 
began to fade with the emergence of the law and economics movement 
and the broad application of the rational actor theory to corporate law 
problems.2   
Rational actor theorists assert that laws should be designed to 
leverage each individual’s propensity to act in his own self-interest.3  
Most corporate law and economics scholarship is premised on the 
assumption that key corporate actors, including directors, managers, 
employees, and investors, are rational wealth maximizers.4  These 
                                                                                                                       
112 U.S.C. § 84 (2011); RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 264-69 (5th ed. 2013). 
2See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMICS 23 (2002) (noting 
that “neoclassical economics is premised on the rational actor theory, which posits an 
autonomous individual who makes rational choices that maximize his satisfactions.”). 
3See Claire Finkelstein, Legal Theory and the Rational Actor, in OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF RATIONALITY 399-416, 400 (Al Mele ed., 2003) (“Rational actor theory assumes human 
beings are rational maximizers who reason instrumentally toward the attainment of their 
ends.”). 
4See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (6th ed. 2003) (“The task 
of economics, so defined, is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a rational 
maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions”). 
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scholars promote policy prescriptions based on the notion that corporate 
officials will respond to monetary incentives created by law and 
institutional structures in a sensible and predictable manner.5  
The notion that corporate managers and directors will act reliably 
in their own self-interest is seductive.  It allows one to imagine a world 
in which one only needs to create the right incentive structure for people 
automatically to make socially optimal decisions. Once we embrace this 
approach, the regulator’s task shifts from adopting or applying legal 
mandates to creating incentive structures that encourage, but do not 
command, corporate officials to pursue socially desirable goals.6  
Theorists insist that this approach is more efficient, less intrusive, and 
less error prone than the command and control or ex post facto dispute 
resolution mechanisms that typify the traditional regulatory regime.7  
The philosophical framework described above has served as the 
basis for the deregulatory agenda that law and economics scholars have 
championed for decades.8  The idea that we can achieve common social 
goals through appeals to individual self-interest underlies three main 
thrusts of this deregulatory project.  First, law and economics scholars 
promote reliance on market mechanisms over regulatory mandates as a 
disciplinary tool.9  On this account, the power of markets to discipline 
executives both explains and justifies courts’ reluctance to enforce 
fiduciary duties or hold corporate officials responsible for malfeasance.10  
                                                                                                                       
5Proponents respond to the charge that assumptions of rationality are unrealistic by 
asserting that they offer merely a model, not a complete description of how individuals always 
behave.  Yet, they claim their model provides a close-enough approximation of human 
behavior to serve as a basis for broad policy prescriptions.  Id. at 17-18. 
6See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 4-7 (1991) (explaining that freedom of choice in governance arrangements 
redounds to the benefit of investors and society); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 37 (arguing 
that by emphasizing a “wealth maximization” command for corporations, society can “take 
advantage of the wealth maximizing incentives built into the firm to alter its behavior at least 
cost”). 
7See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 15-22 (arguing that market 
mechanisms are superior for determining optimal governance standards than processes 
controlled by regulators). 
8See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 442, 442-43 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. 
McDonnell eds., 2012) (describing the corporate law and economics movement). 
9See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 35-39, 93-100; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., 
State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 
255-57 (1977) (asserting that market discipline makes it unlikely that corporate managers 
could systematically exploit shareholders); POSNER, supra note 4, at 427-30 (discussing 
rationales for fiduciary duties and the disciplining effect of the market for corporate control). 
10BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 261 (asserting that “rational shareholders . . . should 
prefer a regime that encourages managerial risk-taking by, inter alia, pre-committing to a 
policy of not litigating the reasonableness of managerial business decisions.”). 
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A related tenet holds that monetary incentives can motivate 
effective management better than legal commands, shareholder power, or 
litigation threats.11  This precept led theorists to urge corporations to 
compensate executives with equity and stock options instead of cash, to 
better align their risk preferences with those of shareholders.12  The 
widespread embrace of this approach spurred an explosion in rates of 
executive pay beginning in the 1990s.13 
Perhaps the most influential axiom of rational actor theory has 
been the broad assertion that sophisticated financial actors can manage 
risk responsibly without the need for government interference or 
oversight.  This assertion bolstered a decades-long effort to dismantle the 
modern financial regulatory structure.  To illustrate, the presumed 
sophistication of large financial institutions served as a main justification 
for adopting the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which demolished the Glass-
Steagall wall separating commercial and investment banking.14  A 
similar refrain echoed throughout policy debates over efforts in the late 
1990s to regulate trading in over-the-counter derivatives.15   
Although widely influential, the neoclassical law and economics 
movement has attracted significant criticism.  The most sustained 
intellectual challenge has come from behavioral economists who 
marshaled psychological research to refute many of law and economics 
fundamental assumptions.  Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, among 
others, have shown that people often act in a predictably irrational 
manner.16  These observations lead behavioral economists to assert that 
the legal system must take into account such systematic irrationality to 
achieve its desired ends.17  They, therefore, urge the adoption of a sort of 
                                                                                                                       
11See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives – Its Not How 
Much You Pay, But How You Pay It, 3 HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (1990).   
12Id.; see also Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle, The False Promise of Risk-Reducing 
Incentive Pay:  Evidence From Executive Pensions and Deferred Compensation, 38 J. CORP. 
L. 53, 55-59 (2012) (summarizing arguments). 
13See Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of 
Pay for Performance, 39 J. CORP. L. 525, 532-34 (2014) (documenting increases in incentive 
based pay for executives).  The increase in equity-based compensation also correlates in time 
with a marked increase in the incidence of corporate and securities fraud. Id. 
14Peter S. Goodman, Taking a Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 8, 2008), http://tinyurl.com/091008-NYT.  See also ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF 
TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW WORLD (2007). 
15See Rick Schmitt, Prophet and Loss, STANFORD ALUMNI MAGAZINE (Mar./Apr. 
2009), http://tinyurl.com/m47twt4. 
16See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1130 (1974); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard 
Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473-76 
(1998) (applying principles to legal analysis). 
17A number of corporate law scholars have embraced this behavioral turn.  For 
important contributions to this proposition, see generally Jayne W. Barnard, Narcissism, Over-
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soft paternalism by which regulators develop policies that “nudge” 
people to make choices that better reflect their true interests, unbound by 
the distracting and distorting mental shortcuts that hamper our everyday 
decision-making.18 
Perhaps more devastating to the law and economics project are 
persistent observations that the most basic predictions of law and 
economics scholars have not been borne out by events on the ground.  
The first inkling of a deep chasm between law and economics theory and 
reality arose during the 1980s’ takeover battles when poison pills, 
antitakeover legislation, and other entrenchment tools took hold.19  Law 
and economics theorists had long maintained that the market for 
corporate control provided a disciplinary effect on corporate 
management that obviated the need for intrusive judicial oversight.20  
These theorists claimed that a vigorous market for corporate control also 
enhanced economic efficiency.21  In their view, antitakeover devices that 
impeded the smooth operation of the market were inimical to investors’ 
interests.  As such, these tactics should have been rejected by state 
lawmakers who were supposedly engaged in a “race to the top” to adopt 
the most efficient corporate law rules.22  Thus, when state legislators and 
judges endorsed a range of corporate antitakeover devices it undermined 
                                                                                                                       
Optimism, Fear, Anger, and Depression:  The Interior Lives of Corporate Leaders, 77 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 405 (2008); Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat:  Lessons 
from the Recent Financial Scandals about Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of 
Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L. J. 285 (2004); LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE:  HOW 
GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE (2011). 
18See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4-6 (2008) (describing the philosophy of 
“libertarian paternalism”); see also GEORGE A. AKERLOFF & ROBERT J. SHILLER ANIMAL 
SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, 1-5 (2009) (providing an 
overview of how decision-making is guided by “animal spirits” or the basic wants and needs 
of each individual); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
19See William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual 
Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 180, 195-96 (1992) (describing how corporate takeover law 
failed to develop in conformity with the law and economics model’s predictions). 
20See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110, 119-20 (1965); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of Target’s 
Management In Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1196-97 (1981).  
21See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 1164; John Coffee, Regulating the 
Market for Corporate Control:  A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate 
Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1294-96 (1984). 
22Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 1164 (“Our investigation leads to the 
conclusion that shareholders’ welfare is maximized by an externally imposed legal rule 
severely limiting the ability of managers to resist a tender offer even if the purpose of 
resistance is to trigger a bidding contest.”); Winter, Jr., supra note 9, at 255-56. 
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theorists’ assertions that regulatory competition would ensure that 
corporate law rules reliably protected shareholder interests.23   
More recently, corporate debacles including the Enron/WorldCom 
scandals, crises in markets for over-the-counter derivatives, and 
sophisticated banks’ failure to manage risk responsibly belied the 
flawless efficacy of a self-regulatory regime.  The cataclysmic bank 
failures of 2008 led even some of the most ardent champions of the 
palliative power of market discipline to abandon the blind faith in 
markets that formed the core of their ideology.24 
Despite persistent critiques and challenges, the rational actor 
approach remains the dominant mode of analysis in corporate law.25  
Legal scholars, judges, and regulators continue to seek guidance from its 
central teachings.  As its proponents frequently assert, it takes a theory to 
beat a theory, and thus far no other corporate law theory has garnered a 
stable of adherents as broad, deep, and prolific as the neoclassical law 
and economics school.  Although behavioral law and economics has 
taken some wind from its sails, the behavioral approach offers more of a 
qualification of law and economics conclusions than an alternative 
comprehensive theory.26   
Interestingly, both traditional law and economics and the more 
nuanced behavioral account tend to disregard the problem that irrational 
or unstable actors introduce into their models.27  Theorists justify this 
                                                                                                                       
23See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 167-174, 205-208 (explaining why a 
free market for corporate control is optimal and criticizing Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence).  
For discussion of the predictive failures of the law and economics approach see Bratton, supra 
note 19, at 195; ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 432 
(2d ed. 2014) (discussing how the market for corporate control does not operate as law and 
economics scholars had predicted). 
24See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated 
Supervised Entities Program, (Sept. 26, 2008) (quoting SEC Chairman Christopher Cox 
concluding that, “[t]he last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation 
does not work”); RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM xii (2009) (“We are learning . 
. . that we need a more active and intelligent government to keep our model of a capitalist 
economy from running off the rails.  The movement to deregulate the financial industry went 
too far by exaggerating the resilience – the self-healing powers—of laissez-faire capitalism”); 
Edmund Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2008) 
(quoting Alan Greenspan’s testimony before Congress that, “[t]hose of us who have looked to 
the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders’ equity, myself included, are in a 
state of shocked disbelief” and “[t]his modern risk-management paradigm held sway for 
decades . . . The whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed in the summer of last year.”). 
25See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 26 (“[I]t is fair to say the economic theory of the 
firm is now the dominant paradigm in corporate law.”); STOUT, supra note 17, at 28-29 
(describing the ascendance of the law and economics movement). 
26See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 442 (explaining that behavioral law and economics 
is not a very well-defined subject). 
27Despite the important contributions of behavioral economists, their prescriptions 
focus mainly on shaping the behavior of individuals whose conduct falls within a “normal” 
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omission by citing a need for parsimony, and with the broader assertion 
that instances of “unbounded” irrationality within the corporate sphere 
are too incidental to be accommodated in their models.28  To succeed in 
corporate America, the thinking goes, one must be healthy 
psychologically.  Irrational decision makers, therefore, will be screened 
out through the natural selection of the corporate tournament process.29   
This Article challenges the standard theoretical account regarding 
the rationality of business leaders.  It reviews scholarly research that 
documents the presence of irrational actors among senior corporate 
managers and considers the impact these executives, whose degree of 
“irrationality” lies beyond normal bounds, might have on corporations 
and society.  The discussion is anchored in psychological literature on 
how people make decisions regarding risk.30   
Research shows that many individuals have a dysfunctional 
approach to risk that leads them to engage in self-destructive conduct.  
By definition, these individuals do not respond to incentives in the 
manner that the rational actor model predicts. A non-trivial number of 
individuals with personality disorders that encompass risk dysfunction 
occupy high positions in corporations.  A major study found, for 
example, that 4% of a sample of 200 managers from seven large 
companies met the clinical definition for psychopathy (a severe and 
destructive personality disorder), a rate four times higher than the rate 
among the general population.31  Another study of corporate managers 
uncovered a higher rate of certain personality disorder traits among a 
sample of corporate executives than they found among comparison 
samples of psychiatric patients and the criminally insane.32   
                                                                                                                       
range.  Like their cohorts in law and economics, they eschew efforts to constrain the conduct 
of those whose moral standards or decisional capacities lie far outside the norm. 
28See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 23-26 (addressing objections to assumptions 
of rationality).   
29See Langevoort, supra note 17, at 288 (“[I]nvoking psychological traits makes the 
orthodox corporate scholars queasy for a variety of well-mooted reasons, including their 
contingent, soft, hard-to-model properties and the economists' natural suspicion that cognitive 
weaknesses are weeded out in the crucible of corporate competition and thus trivial.”); 
POSNER, supra note 24, at 77 (expressing skepticism that failures of rationality among top 
bank executive contributed to the financial crisis). 
30The Article adopts the term “antisocial risk takers” to describe individuals with a 
propensity to act in ways that are antithetical to their own interests and the interests of society. 
31Paul Babiak, Craig S. Neumann & Robert D. Hare, Corporate Psychopathy: Talking 
the Walk, 28 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 178-79 (2010).  An additional 4.4% of managers in the sample 
had scores indicating a subclinical level of psychopathy, which were below the diagnostic 
threshold, but high enough to cause problems significant problems for their firms.  Id. at 183-
184. 
32Belinda Jane Board & Katerina Fritzon, Disordered Personalities at Work, 11 
PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 17, 23-25 (2005) (reporting that the mean score for business managers 
for the histrionic scale of a personality assessment was significantly higher than the patient 
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Certainly, the vast majority of corporate managers are not affected 
by these problems.  Still, the percentage of troubled executives is not so 
small that we can safely ignore the implications of their presence in 
corporate management.33  Nor can we take comfort in the belief that such 
troubled individuals could never reach the highest levels of corporate 
leadership.  To the contrary, studies show that individuals with antisocial 
tendencies are overrepresented in the ranks of corporate leaders.  In fact, 
research shows that a sub-category of so-called “successful psychopaths” 
may be more adept at climbing the corporate ladder than most others.  
When individuals plagued by serious psychological problems 
manage to reach the top of corporations, they have the potential to cause 
significant damage.  This possibility compels us to consider how policy 
prescriptions based on the rational actor model are likely to play out in 
the real world.  One potential danger is that corporate governance 
policies that promote the pursuit of self-interest have the unintended 
effect of attracting individuals with antisocial traits to join the corporate 
workforce.34  Another concern is that policies that emphasize self-interest 
may exacerbate antisocial tendencies among corporate employees, 
leading to increasingly risky and unethical corporate conduct.  
This Article explores these possibilities and makes 
recommendations for reforms. It argues that the presence of irrational 
actors in corporate hierarchies undermines the soundness of certain 
corporate governance orthodoxies – such as the disciplining effects of 
incentive compensation and the tournament for corporate promotion.  It 
identifies red flags in the personal conduct of corporate executives that 
suggest a dysfunctional approach to risk.  Drawing on psychological 
research, the Article makes suggestions for how directors and investors 
should respond to reports of aberrant behavior by executives.  
 Part II surveys literature in psychology and neuroscience 
addressing the relationship between an individual’s personality and her 
propensity toward risk.  It focuses analysis on antisocial risk taking, 
reviewing research that helps to explain why some people systematically 
take such risks.  Part III reviews research probing the biological 
mechanisms that underlie financial decision making.  These studies, 
                                                                                                                       
samples and that scores for the narcissistic scale and compulsive scale were higher, although 
these differences were not statistically significant). 
33Consider, for example, if the above-referenced percentages were to hold across the 
corporate landscape, up to 20 (4%) Fortune 500 executives would be clinical psychopaths.  
34PAUL BABIAK & ROBERT HARE, SNAKES IN SUITS: WHEN PSYCHOPATHS GO TO 
WORK x-xiii (2006) (explaining why psychopathic individuals may appear to be desirable job 
candidates); Langevoort, supra note 17, at 288 (“[T]raits such as over-optimism, an inflated 
sense of self-efficacy and a deep capacity for ethical self-deception are favored in corporate 
promotion tournaments, so that people who possess them are disproportionately represented in 
executive suites.”). 
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conducted in lab settings and with traders in the field, suggest that a 
moderate approach to risk correlates with investment success. 
Part IV examines correlations between risk seeking conduct in an 
executive’s personal life and reckless or illegal conduct in one’s 
professional role.  It focuses on two personality traits – narcissism and 
psychopathy – that researchers have linked to corporate risk taking, 
performance volatility, and fraud.  It examines the extent to which these 
traits are represented among corporate managers and reviews studies that 
assess the impact of these traits on corporate decision-making. 
Part V draws lessons for regulators, investors, and corporate 
officials based on current understandings of what drives people toward 
antisocial risk.  It considers the challenges that irrational actors as 
corporate leaders pose for certain tenets of corporate governance theory.  
It discusses how directors and investors should respond to reports of 
reckless behavior by corporate executives.  Drawing on examples of 
CEOs at firms destroyed by scandal, it highlights several forms of 
aberrant behavior that directors and investors should address to protect 
their firms from a downward ethical spiral.35    
 
II. RETHINKING RISK 
 
 Law and economics-based conceptions on how to best manage 
business risk have come to dominate corporate and financial law policy.  
Most contemporary corporate theorist accept as a truism that 
policymakers should avoid adopting legal rules that would deter 
managers from taking business risks.36  These theorists insist that risk-
averse shareholders can rely on portfolio diversification to reduce or 
eliminate firm-specific risk.  Shareholders, therefore, should care little 
about the success or failure of a single firm, because losses at one firm 
will likely be offset by gains at other firms whose securities they hold.  
Managers, however, cannot diversify so easily.  Their salaries, bonuses, 
perquisites, and stock options are all tied up in their employers’ fortunes.  
This lack of diversification means managers are almost always more risk 
avoidant than shareholders would find ideal.   
This chain of logic provides the primary justification for the lax 
liability regime for corporate officers and directors. Federal judge Ralph 
                                                                                                                       
35See Robert Cialdini, Noah J. Goldstein & Petia K. Petrova, The Hidden Costs of 
Organizational Dishonesty, 45 MIT SLOAN MGT. REV., 67 (2004) (“[O]rganizations that 
behave unethically will find themselves heading down a slippery and dangerous fiscal path.”).  
36See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 
7.19 (1994); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 110-15 (2004) (explaining that the business judgment rule benefits 
shareholders because it does not discourage risk taking).  
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Winter, a former law professor, was one of the first jurists to introduce 
this theory into corporate law doctrine.37  In Joy v. North, Winter 
explained “because potential profit often corresponds to the potential 
risk, it is very much in the interests of shareholders that the law not 
create incentives for overly cautious decisions.”38  Judges in Delaware 
adopted similar reasoning and began to cite the fear of dampening risk 
taking to defend a range of policies that are highly deferential to the 
authority of corporate managers.  
In Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l Inc., Delaware Chancellor William 
Allen asserted, “directors will tend to deviate from [the] rational 
acceptance of corporate risk if in authorizing the corporation to 
undertake a risky investment, the directors must assume some degree of 
personal risk relating to ex post facto claims of derivative liability for 
any resulting corporate loss.”39  Similar reasoning appears prominently in 
other significant Delaware court decisions, which, over time, have 
dramatically narrowed the scope of directors’ fiduciary duties.40  
The law and economics school’s worshipful attitude toward risk 
also helped advance efforts to dismantle the financial regulatory system 
established by the New Deal.  Theorists first asserted that impersonal 
trading markets could do better at pricing risk and facilitating risk 
management than rules set by regulators.41  They also claimed that 
sophisticated investors could protect themselves when taking risks and 
should not be burdened by paternalistic regulation.  Finally, theorists 
argued that new financial products, including options, swaps, and 
                                                                                                                       
37See Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, The Import of History to Corporate Law, 59 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 683, 696-697 (2015) (tracing doctrinal developments). 
38692 F.2d 880, 886 (1982). 
39683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
40See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A. 2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (“Should the Court apportion liability based on the ultimate outcome of decisions taken 
in good faith by faithful directors or officers, those decision-makers would necessarily take 
decisions that minimize risk, not maximize value. The entire advantage of the risk-taking, 
innovative, wealth-creating engine that is the Delaware corporation would cease to exist, with 
disastrous results for shareholders and society alike.”); In Re Citigroup Inc. S’holder 
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“To impose liability on directors for making 
a ‘wrong’ business decision would cripple their ability to earn returns for investors by taking 
business risks.”). 
41See Derivative Financial Markets (Part I): Hearings before the Subcomm. on 
Telecommunications and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 
118 (1994) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Gov. of the Fed. Reserve Sys.)  
(“There is nothing involved in federal regulation per se which makes it superior to market 
regulation.”); see also JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC 
CALAMITIES 4 (2009) (summarizing Greenspan’s views on the power of free markets).  
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securitization, enhanced economic welfare by enabling markets to spread 
risk and distribute it to those most equipped to bear it.42  
These arguments helped support financial reform legislation that 
weakened regulatory constraints on risk.  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
of 1999 demolished the Glass-Steagall wall separating commercial and 
investment banking.  Soon thereafter, the Commodities and Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 halted efforts to regulate trading in over the 
counter derivatives.43  The same philosophy influenced new global 
banking standards.  In the Basel II accords, bank regulators across the 
world agreed to defer more readily to large banks’ internal risk 
management systems at the expense of uniform standards for capital and 
external oversight.44 
The policy prescriptions described above are all based on 
assumptions of rationality – the belief that corporate managers and 
investors will reasonably weigh the potential costs and benefits of their 
decisions and act in a manner consistent with their self-interest.45  
Despite its broad acceptance, there is not much evidence to support the 
core assumptions of rational actor theory.46  Instead, a growing body of 
research undermines assumptions as to both the “rationality” and 
“selfishness” of individuals in a variety of situations.47   
 More importantly, the policies recommended by rational actor 
theorists have failed to produce the predicted results.  Rather than 
expertly managing risk, many of the largest and most sophisticated 
financial institutions failed or were rescued due to disastrous business 
                                                                                                                       
42CASSIDY, supra note 41, at 13 (“the basic idea was that by putting a market price on 
risk and distributing it to investors willing and able to bear it these complex securities greatly 
reduced the chances of an economic crisis.”). 
43Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Gov. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the 
Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Government 
Regulation and Derivative Contracts (Feb. 21, 1997) (“In the case of the institutional off-
exchange derivatives market, it seems abundantly clear that government market regulation is 
quite effectively and efficiently achieving what have been identified as the public policy 
objectives of private regulation.”). 
44CARNELL, ET AL., supra note 1, at 25, 220. 
45Although law and economics theorists concede they offer only a model that is not 
meant to describe of how all individuals act, they claim their model provides a close enough 
approximation of real human behavior to serve as the basis for sweeping policy reforms.  See 
POSNER, supra note 4, at 17. 
46See AKERLOFF & SHILLER, supra note 18, at 41-42 (“With only a small amount of 
evidence, but with a powerful notion of how people behave, the economists of the 1960s 
decided economic decisions should be viewed as based on rational behavior.”). 
47See generally id.; JOHN COATES, THE HOUR BETWEEN DOG AND WOLF: RISK 
TAKING, GUT FEELINGS AND THE BIOLOGY OF BOOM AND BUST (2012); STOUT, supra note 
17. 
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decisions.48  At the same time, purportedly sophisticated investors 
including banks, hedge funds, and mutual funds flocked to speculate in 
over-the-counter derivatives and mortgage backed securities, and then 
lost billions when the real estate market cratered.49  
A close examination of the factors that influence risk-related 
decisions helps explain why so many policies premised on the rational 
actor model went wrong.  Despite the core assumptions of the rational 
actor model, research shows that our decisions regarding risk are 
governed by our emotions, rather than a rational thought process.50  
Furthermore, individual approaches to risk vary widely, which means 
that corporate governance policies are likely to impact different 
individual’s behavior in different ways.  Most importantly, some people 
have a dysfunctional approach to risk.  These individuals are unlikely to 
respond to policies based on rational actor theory in the manner that 
theorists predict.  For these reasons, policies based on the rational actor 
model may lead to unexpected and undesirable results.  
 
A. Risk Taking: the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 
 
Corporate scholars tend to view risk taking solely as a “good” that 
society must encourage.  As law and economics scholars Easterbrook 
and Fischel put it, shareholders “want managers to take projects with the 
highest mean returns, which may entail high risk (No pain, no gain).”51  
Although this aphorism has the ring of truth, it overlooks the corollary 
that great risk also brings the prospect of devastating losses.  Our legal 
system, therefore, must balance the competing objectives of encouraging 
reasonable risk taking while constraining irresponsible risk.   
Evaluating risk taking from the perspective of its impact on society 
can help us discern appropriate legal policies toward risk.  To this end, 
we can divide risk taking into three main categories: prosocial, neutral, 
and antisocial risk.52  Prosocial risks encompass some danger, but also 
                                                                                                                       
48THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, 
xviii-xx (2011) (“We conclude dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk 
management at many systemically important financial institutions were a key cause of this 
crisis . . . Too many of these institutions acted recklessly, taking on too much risk . . . .”). 
49See, e.g., Gregory Meyer, CFTC Head Blames OTC Derivatives for Crisis, FIN. 
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2010), http://tinyurl.com/FT-CFTC-250111; Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was 
Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/NYT-Chan. 
50See Andrew W. Lo & Dmitry V. Repin, The Psychophysiology of Real-Time 
Financial Risk Processing, 14 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 323, 332 (2002) (“emotional 
responses are significant factors in real time processing of financial risk”). 
51EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 99-100. 
52This typology is adopted from Michael R. Levenson, Risk Taking and Personality, 
58 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1073 (1990). 
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offer the prospect of benefits that exceed their potential harm. 
Innovation, entrepreneurship, exploration, and social cooperation all 
require us to confront uncertainty and the possibility of monetary loss, 
rejection, and failure.  
This positive perspective on risk helps explain the basic bargain 
society strikes with entrepreneurs and investors.  Limited liability for 
corporate shareholders allows those with new ideas and others willing to 
fund them to protect their personal assets from creditors in the event the 
venture fails.  Similarly, the business judgment rule protects directors 
from liability when well-considered business decisions turn out badly.  
Heroism is another form of prosocial risk taking where an individual 
exposes himself to danger in an effort to help others.  A firefighter who 
rushes into a burning building or a Good Samaritan who assists an 
accident victim does not focus on how he might benefit from his actions.   
Another form of risk taking, often conflated with heroism, is 
neutral from a societal perspective.  Adventurous risk seekers such as 
rock climbers and skydivers seem to court danger for the thrills it brings.  
These adventurous risk takers, who are usually careful to prepare and 
exercise precautions, do not act help others.  Still, their behavior rarely 
poses a threat to outsiders.  
When cast as heroism, entrepreneurship, or adventurousness, risk 
taking is viewed in a positive light.  The positive aspects of risk taking 
begin to fade when the pursuit of risk takes a pathological turn.  At this 
point, the potential benefits of risk taking are far outweighed by their 
potential costs.  For this reason, society generally seeks to discourage 
these kinds of risks.  
Common forms of antisocial risk taking include cigarette smoking, 
substance abuse, and compulsive gambling; conduct that threatens to 
harm both the risk taker and innocent others.  Although these divergent 
forms of antisocial risk taking are not always connected in the public 
mind, psychologists and neuroscientists believe they are all rooted in 
biological mechanisms centered in the pleasure centers in the brain.  
Research also shows that a propensity toward impulsivity correlates with 
substance abuse, gambling, financial risk taking, and other forms of 
antisocial conduct. 53 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
53For summaries of research on impulsivity and risk taking, see generally 
IMPULSIVITY: THE BEHAVIORAL AND NEUROLOGICAL SCIENCE OF DISCOUNTING (Gregory J. 
Madden & Warren K. Bickel eds. 2009); MARVIN ZUCKERMAN, BEHAVIOR EXPRESSIONS 
AND BIOSOCIAL BASES OF SENSATION SEEKING (1994).  
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B. Impulsivity and Antisocial Risk Taking 
 
Neuroscience research provides some insights into what lies 
behind the darker side of risk.  Psychologists have found antisocial risk 
taking correlates closely with a trait called impulsivity.  Psychologists 
define impulsivity as “a tendency to act on whim and, in so doing, 
disregard a more rational long-term strategy for success.”54  There is, for 
example, substantial evidence that individuals who suffer from substance 
abuse or gambling problems have a consistent tendency to pursue large 
gains while irrationally disregarding the risk of higher offsetting losses.  
These antisocial risk takers systematically make disadvantageous choices 
in lab administered gambling tasks, when compared to controls.  
Substance abusers and gambling addicts also tend to discount future 
rewards and losses more significantly than controls.  
Psychologists believe that one’s propensity toward risk is not 
limited to one life domain, but instead represents a more deep-seated 
deficit in impulse control.55  These researchers view impulsivity as a 
trait, “a persistent tendency to behave in an impulsive manner.”56  Risk 
seeking pathologies manifest in behavior such as substance abuse, 
gambling, overspending, and other problematic conduct including 
dishonesty, crime, and the failure to comply with social norms. 
   
1. The Iowa Gambling Task 
 
Experts in impulsivity hypothesize that antisocial behavior such as 
gambling and substance abuse manifests “an underlying disorder of 
impulse control.”57  In studies, substance abusers consistently make more 
irrational choices than controls on the Iowa Gambling Task.  In these 
studies, subjects play a gambling game in which they choose from four 
decks of cards with varying probabilities for winning money and 
incurring losses.58  Two decks of cards offer participants occasional large 
                                                                                                                       
54Gregory Madden & Patrick Johnson, A Delay Discounting Primer, in IMPULSIVITY: 
THE BEHAVIORAL AND NEUROLOGICAL SCIENCE OF DISCOUNTING, supra note 53, at 11. 
55See ZUCKERMAN, supra note 53, at 225 (“There is considerable evidence for the 
concept of an ‘addictive personality’”). 
56See Leonard & Joel Myerson, Experimental and Correlational Analyses of Delay 
and Probability Discounting, in IMPULSIVITY: THE BEHAVIORAL AND NEUROLOGICAL 
SCIENCE OF DISCOUNTING, supra note 53, at 68. 
57See Nancy M. Petry & Gregory J. Madden, Discounting and Pathological Gambling, 
in IMPULSIVITY: THE BEHAVIORAL AND NEUROLOGICAL SCIENCE OF DISCOUNTING, supra 
note 53, at 275.   
58For a more detailed description of the Iowa Gambling Task, see Antoine Bechara et 
al., Differential Contributions of Human Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex to 
Decision Making, 19 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5473, 5474-75 (1999). 
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monetary rewards, but are stacked against the players due to occasional 
substantial losses.  The two other decks offer smaller rewards, but are 
ultimately more profitable because low probability losses are also 
smaller. 
When compared to controls, substance abusers and problem 
gamblers choose from the high risk/high loss deck more frequently and 
persistently.59 Behavioral differences on the gambling task were more 
pronounced when subjects abused more than one substance (such as 
alcohol and drugs) and among substance abusers who also suffered from 
a gambling disorder.60  A recent meta-analysis of 63 studies using the 
Iowa Gambling Task found that decision making is impaired by a range 
of clinical conditions including anxiety, substance abuse, gambling 
disorders, depression, and personality disorders.61 
   
2. Delay Discounting  
 
In addition to making more irrational choices on the Iowa 
Gambling Task, problem gamblers and substance abusers also tend to 
discount future gains and losses more steeply than controls.62  In delay 
discounting studies, subjects choose between receiving a sum of money 
(such as $1,000) in the future and accepting a smaller amount 
immediately.63  The indifference point, or the dollar amount at which a 
subject will opt for an immediate reward over a later larger sum, differs 
from person to person.  Delay discounting studies show that substance 
abusers and problem gamblers have higher rates of delay discounting 
than do controls.64 
In these studies, substance abusers and gambling addicts have 
lower indifference points than non-users and indifference points vary 
with the severity of addiction.65  Subjects with more than one addiction 
disorder showed even higher rates of delay discounting.  Taken as a 
                                                                                                                       
59Petry & Madden, supra note 57, at 278. 
60Id. at 278.  
61See Dahlia Mukherjee & Joseph W. Kable, Value-Based Decision Making in Mental 
Illness: A Meta-Analysis, 2 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. SCI.  767 (2014), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/14-CLPSY-MK. 
62Richard Yi et al., Delay Discounting and Substance Abuse, in IMPULSIVITY: THE 
BEHAVIORAL AND NEUROLOGICAL SCIENCE OF DISCOUNTING, supra note 53, at 191, 192.  
For a recent review of delay discounting literature, see Amy L. Odum, Delay Discounting: 
Trait Variable?, 87 BEHAV. PROCESSES 1, 1 (2011) (“Delay discounting is of growing interest 
because of its relation to a number of socially important problems”). 
63See Petry & Madden, supra note 57, at 29-30 (describing delay discounting studies 
and methodologies). 
64Yi et al., supra note 62, at 193; Petry & Madden, supra note 57, at 279. 
65Yi et al., supra note 62. 
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whole, delay discounting studies suggest that “pathological gambling and 
substance abuse disorders lie along a continuum of delay discounting,” 
and that “moderately high rates of discounting may be a risk factor for 
developing a problem with either drugs or gambling.”66  
 
C. The Biological Basis for Risk Taking 
 
Neuroscientists have focused on dopamine as a neurotransmitter 
that plays a key role in the development of addiction.67  Studies show 
that addictive stimuli such as sugar, food, alcohol, and cocaine all affect 
the brain by creating a surge of dopamine in the nucleus accumbens, 
creating a pleasant sensation that reinforces the activity associated with 
the stimulus.68  The same brain mechanisms that influence one’s 
propensity to addiction also influence one’s approach to financial risk.  
Neuroimaging studies show that the nucleus accumbens, the brain region 
activated by stimulant drugs like cocaine, responds similarly to the 
opportunity to win financial rewards. 69  Taken together, these studies 
suggest that various types of risk seeking behavior have a common 
biological basis.   
In addition, our propensities toward risk seem to be inherited.  
Genes that control dopamine processing have been linked to various 
forms of risk seeking behavior.70  Specific dopamine receptor genes have 
been linked to an increased risk for substance abuse, gambling problems, 
sensation seeking, and ADHD.71  The genetic traits associated with these 
disorders also seem to influence an individual’s approach to financial 
risk.72 
 
                                                                                                                       
66Petry & Madden, supra note 57, at 280-81; see also Odum, supra note 62, at 6 
(noting that “a person who is relatively impulsive in one situation may tend to be relatively 
impulsive in other situations”). 
67See Nora D. Volkow et al., Beyond Dopamine Reward Circuitry, 108 PNAS 15037, 
15037 (2011); Marvin Zuckerman & D. Michael Kuhlman, Personality and Risk-Taking: 
Common Biosocial Factors, 68 J. PERSON. 999, 1024 (2000).  
68COATES, supra note 47, at 148 (noting that food, sex, nicotine, cocaine, and 
amphetamines all raise dopamine levels in animals); DAVID J. LINDEN, THE COMPASS OF 
PLEASURE 43-46 (2011). 
69Joshua W. Buckholtz et al., Mesolimbic Dopamine Reward System Hypersensitivity 
in Individuals with Psychopathic Traits, 13 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE  419, 419-20 (2010).  
70See Camelia M. Kuhnen & Joan Y. Chiao, Genetic Determinants of Financial Risk 
Taking, 4 PLOS ONE 1 (2009) (individuals with the “7-repeat allele [of the DRD4 gene] have 
higher novelty seeking scores than those with other DRD4 variants and are more likely to be 
pathological gamblers”).   
71See infra note 91. 
72See infra text at notes 91- 95. 
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1. The Biological Underpinnings of Substance Abuse 
 
Although we tend to view addiction as a sign of personal failings, 
neuroscientists and psychologists have come to regard addiction as a 
biological disorder.73  The biological model of addiction posits that 
certain individuals are susceptible to addiction based on how the brain 
responds to the anticipation of rewards.  More specifically, the brain 
pathways involved in processing dopamine seem to play an important 
role in the development of addiction.   
As neuroscientists explain it, experiences that cause the ventral 
tegmental area of the brain to release dopamine to the nucleus 
accumbens are experienced as pleasurable and motivate a desire to repeat 
the experience.74  An addict becomes driven to pursue the feeling of 
euphoria provided by the dopamine burst, despite the risk of losing many 
other things he values.  With additional exposure to a stimulus like 
cocaine, the dopamine surge begins to drift forward in time, so that the 
surge comes upon exposure to cues associated with the stimulus, rather 
than the stimulus itself.75  At the same time that dopamine release drifts 
forward in time, the pleasure associated with the stimulus begins to 
fade.76  A larger dose of the drug is required to prompt a similar feeling 
of pleasure.  As dependence develops into addiction, the brain structure 
begins to change as dopamine release dwindles with each exposure to the 
drug.77  
To illustrate, consider a young professional who associates cocaine 
with the pulsing lights and music of his favorite nightclub, where he first 
began to use cocaine as a recreational drug.  Over time, the club music or 
the downtown area where he parties can prompt a craving for cocaine.  
After several months of partying, he finds that he does not enjoy cocaine 
as much, but the urge to use remains strong.  He needs to use increasing 
amounts of cocaine just to feel normal.78  
                                                                                                                       
73See Martha J. Farah, Neuroethics: The Ethical, Legal and Societal Impact of 
Neuroscience, 63 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 571, 586 (2012) (stating that as a result of 
neuroscience research, addiction is now viewed “more as a medical problem than a failure of 
moral responsibility.”). 
74LINDEN, supra note 68, at 43. 
75Volkow et al., supra note 67, at 15039-40 (finding increased dopamine activity in 
addicts on exposure to drug cues, rather than the administering of drugs); COATES, supra note 
68, at 150 (“Dopamine provides not a reward but a craving for the triggering stimulus, be it 
information, food, sex or drugs”).  
76COATES, supra note 47, at 138 (“The really powerful motivation is now the craving 
of the drug rather than the pleasure it provides.”). 
77LINDEN, supra note 68, at 53, 61. 
78ZUCKERMAN, supra note 53, at 230 (“the drug abuser is first motivated by curiosity, 
then by pleasure and finally by the need to avoid pain and feel normal”). 
2017 THE IRRATIONAL CEO 731 
Of course, most people who drink alcohol or try other addictive 
substances do not become addicts.79  Many people drink or use drugs 
occasionally, yet avoid the trap of addiction.80  Although researchers 
remain puzzled over what distinguishes potential addicts from casual 
users and abstainers, most experts believe the risk for addiction is 
determined in part by a person’s biological makeup.   
The fact that substance abuse runs in families provides one 
indication of a genetic basis for addiction.81  In addition, genetic studies 
of twins show that up to 60% of the variability in the incidence of 
addiction is attributable to heritable factors.82  Scientists have identified 
genes that control dopamine processing that contribute to the risk for 
addiction.  One subtype of a dopamine receptor gene correlates with 
alcoholism and other forms of abuse.83  The form of alcoholism 
associated with this gene subtype is a stubborn form of addiction that 
tends to begin in adolescence and is more prone to relapse after multiple 
attempts to quit.84  
  
2. The Biological Roots of Problem Gambling  
 
Like substance abuse, research suggests that a propensity toward 
problem gambling is in part biologically determined.  Problem gamblers 
are more likely than others to suffer from alcoholism, drug addiction, and 
other forms of substance abuse.85  In addition, neuroimaging studies 
show that gambling activates the nucleus accumbens, the same brain 
region activated by sugary food or stimulant drugs.86 Scientists have 
therefore concluded that pathological gambling is another form of 
                                                                                                                       
79Volkow et al., supra note 67, at 15037 (explaining that only a small percentage of 
individuals exposed to drugs will become addicted). 
80LINDEN, supra note 68, at 49-50 (reporting that about 80% of those who try 
cigarettes, 35% of those who try heroin, 22% of those who try cocaine, 8% of those who try 
marijuana, and 4% of those who try alcohol become addicted).  
81Id. at 64. 
82See Mary Jeanne Kreek et al., Genetic Influences on Impulsivity, Risk Taking, Stress 
Responsivity and Vulnerability to Drug Abuse and Addiction, 11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 
1450 (2005) (“Family and twin epidemiological studies show that genes contribute to the 
vulnerability to addictive disease, with estimates of heritability of 30-60%.”). 
83LINDEN, supra note 68, at 64-65 (discussing the link between the A1 variant of the 
DRD2 dopamine receptor gene and the risk of addiction). 
84Id.; Ernest P. Noble, The DRD2 Gene in Psychiatric and Neurological Disorders 
and Its Phenotypes, 1 PHARMACOGENOMICS 309, 309 (2000) (finding that there is 
significantly higher frequency and prevalence of the DRD2 A1 allele in alcoholics).   
85LINDEN, supra note 68, at 130 (reporting that the rate of alcoholism among 
compulsive gamblers is ten times higher than the general population and that the rate of 
tobacco use is six times higher). 
86Id. at 127. 
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addiction with roots in the biochemical pathways of the brain.87  
According to this account, the anticipation of monetary rewards and the 
associated uncertainty prompt the release of dopamine to the nucleus 
accumbens, bringing a feeling of momentary euphoria accompanied by 
the urge to gamble.88  
As with other forms of addiction, a genetic basis exists for 
compulsive gambling.  Like substance abuse, problem gambling tends to 
run in families and twin studies point to genetic factors contributing 
roughly 35-55 percent to the variance in the incidence of problem 
gambling.89 Genes identified as contributing to substance abuse are also 
associated with an increased risk for pathological gambling.90 When one 
also considers the co-morbidity of substance abuse and gambling, it is 
likely that a common biological profile lies at the root of both forms of 
addiction. 
 
III. THE SCIENCE OF FINANCIAL RISK TAKING 
 
 Neuroscientists working in lab settings and in the field have 
begun to explore the brain mechanisms underlying financial decision-
making.  These scientists have identified neurotransmitters and naturally 
occurring hormones that influence our approach to financial risk.  
Scientists have also identified several genes that contribute to financial 
risk taking.91  These same genes have been found to contribute to the 
susceptibility to substance abuse, problem gambling, and other forms of 
antisocial conduct. 
From these studies it appears that the rational actor model fails to 
capture the complexity surrounding decisions regarding risk.92  Indeed, 
                                                                                                                       
87See Luke Clark et al., Pathological Choice: The Neuroscience of Gambling and 
Gambling Addiction, 33 J. NEUROSCIENCE 17617, 17619 (2013) (stating that dopamine has 
been a prime candidate for investigations of neurochemical abnormalities in pathological 
gamblers given its established roles in both drug addiction and rewarded behavior). 
88Id.; LINDEN, supra note 68, at 137 (hypothesizing based on animal experiments that 
“we are hardwired to get a pleasure buzz from risky events.”). 
89See Daniella S.S. Lobo & James L. Kennedy, The Genetics of Gambling and 
Behavioral Addictions, 11 CNS SPECTRUM 931, 934 (2006); Nancy M. Petry, Gambling and 
Substance Use Disorders:  Current Status and Future Directions, 16 AM. J. ADDICTIONS 1 
(2007); Seth A. Eisen et al., Familial Influences on Gambling Behavior: An Analysis of 3359 
Twin Pairs, 93 ADDICTION 1375, 1380 (1998).  
90Kreek et al., supra note 82, at 1453; Kuhnen & Chiao, supra note 70, at 1. 
91See Anna Dreber et al., The 7R Polymorphism in the Dopamine Receptor D4 Gene 
(DRD4) is Associated with Financial Risk Taking in Men, 30 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 85, 
86 (2009); Kuhnen & Chiao, supra note 70, at 1. 
92COATES, supra note 47, at 31-36; Camelia M. Kuhnen & Brian Knutson, The Neural 
Basis of Financial Risk Taking, 47 NEURON 763, 768 (2005) (suggesting “that 
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risk-related decisions are influenced both by our biology and our 
environment, which sometimes guide us toward irrationality.  In 
addition, the same biological factors that contribute to antisocial risk 
taking seem to influence decisions to take financial risks.93  Taken as a 
whole, the bulk of neuroscience research suggests that risk taking per se 
does not correlate with investment success.94  Instead, research links 
biological markers consistent with a moderate approach towards risk to 
long-term investment success.95 
 
A.  Lab Studies 
 
Neuroscience studies of financial decision-making focus on the 
dopamine reward system, the same brain pathway linked to substance 
abuse and other forms of risk seeking behavior.96  These studies show 
that the nucleus accumbens is activated preceding risky decisions, such 
as a decision to buy stock.97  In contrast, a risk averse decision, such as 
purchasing a bond, is preceded by activation of the anterior insula – a 
brain region associated with the anticipation of adverse events.98  
Researchers, thus, conclude that anticipation of reward or gain activates 
the nucleus accumbens and motivates risk taking, while the anticipation 
of loss indicated by activation of the anterior insula motivates risk averse 
decisions.99   
As with the tendency toward addiction, to some extent our 
investment preferences are biologically determined.  Studies show that 
roughly 25% of the variation in financial risk preferences is attributable 
to inheritable factors and that genes play a role in predicting investment 
success.100  Scientists have identified a variation of a dopamine receptor 
                                                                                                                       
neuroeconomics research may foster a more comprehensive theory of individual decision 
making than the rational actor model”). 
93See Buckholtz et al., supra note 69, at 419-20.  
94Steve Sapra, Laura E. Beavin & Paul J. Zak, A Combination of Dopamine Genes 
Predicts Success by Professional Wall Street Traders, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 5 (2012) (“[S]uccessful 
traders in our sample weigh risk and reward, rather than taking excessive risks.”). 
95Id. at 1. 
96Kuhnen & Knutson, supra note 92, at 763; Dreber et al., supra note 91, at 86 (stating 
that risk preferences may be influenced by dopamine pathways in the brain). Researchers have 
also investigated the role of serotonin transporter genes, the MOA-A gene and the COMT gene 
in financial risk taking. Id. 
97Kuhnen & Knutson, supra note 92, at 765. 
98Id.   
99See id. at 766; Brian Knutson & Gregory Samanez-Larkin, Brain, Decision and 
Debt, in A DEBTOR WORLD: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON DEBT 167 (R. BRUBAKER 
ET AL. eds. 2012). 
100Sapra et al., supra note 94, at 1 (twin studies show that “29% of the variation in the 
decision to invest in stocks is attributed to genetics” and “25% of portfolio risk is due to one’s 
genes”). 
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gene that correlates with financial risk taking.  A study of Harvard 
University students found that subjects with the specified type of 
dopamine receptor gene invested more money in risky assets in a lab 
administered investment task than did controls.101  In a similar study of 
Northwestern University students, subjects with the same gene variation 
were more likely than controls to make risky investment choices in lab-
based investment tasks.102 
Taken together, neuroscience studies of risk taking suggest that 
optimal financial decision-making requires dopamine levels sufficient to 
motivate a person to take financial risks.  At excessive levels, however, 
dopamine appears to contribute to irrational and destructive risk-seeking 
behavior.  Additional studies of traders in the field lend support to this 
conclusion regarding the value of moderation in investing. 
 
B.  Field Studies  
 
Recent field studies of traders shed light on the biological traits 
that contribute to investment success.  In these studies, biomarkers that 
correlate with moderately high levels of dopamine also correlated with 
better financial performance.  At the same time, high levels of the stress 
hormone cortisol were associated with irrational risk aversion.  Levels of 
these endogenous hormones fluctuate naturally in the human body, 
influenced both by one’s environment and one’s emotional state in a 
synergistic feedback loop. 
   
1.  London Traders 
 
Neuroscientist and former trader John Coates and his colleagues 
conducted several of studies of high-frequency traders in London.  They 
found that higher levels of circulating testosterone in male traders 
correlated with better short-term trading performance.103 In the study, 
traders who performed well, earning above-average profits on a 
particular day, began the next day with significantly higher testosterone 
                                                                                                                       
101Dreber et al., supra note 91, at 89 (finding that subjects with a 7-repeat allele of the 
DRD4 gene made more risky investment choices). 
102Kuhnen & Chiao, supra note 70, at 3 (reporting the same result for subjects with 7-
repeat DRD4 gene).  The authors also found that subjects with two short alleles of the 
serotonin transporter gene (S-HTTLPR) were more likely to make risk averse investment 
choices.  The serotonin transporter gene contributes to mood regulation and individuals with 
two short alleles are more prone to anxiety and depression. 
103J.M. Coates & J. Herbert, Endogenous Steroids and Financial Risk Taking on a 
London Trading Floor, 16 PNAS 6167 (2008); see also Coren L. Apicella et al., Testosterone 
and Financial Risk Preferences, 29 EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAV. 384, 387 (2008) 
(finding that high testosterone levels correlated with risk taking in a laboratory setting). 
2017 THE IRRATIONAL CEO 735 
levels.  These higher morning testosterone levels, in turn, correlated with 
higher average trading returns for that afternoon.  According to Coates, 
testosterone and dopamine “work synergistically, with testosterone 
achieving its exciting effects largely by increasing dopamine in the 
nucleus accumbens.”104  The authors interpreted testosterone’s impact on 
trader’s activities as “optimizing performance,” rather than encouraging 
risk.105   
Coates’s findings are consistent with research in animals and 
human athletes which suggests the existence of a “winner effect” in 
physical competitions, in which the winner of a contest or fight 
experiences an increase in circulating testosterone which translates into 
increased confidence, improved cognitive and physical performance, and 
increased risk-taking.  The pumped-up competitor goes on to win future 
contests and creates a feedback loop of wins, increased confidence, and 
further competitive advantages.106  
There are, however, limits to the “winner effect” – a proverbial 
“sweet spot” beyond which higher levels of circulating testosterone 
become destructive by encouraging overconfidence, hyper-aggression, 
and recklessness.107  In animal studies, as testosterone levels rose beyond 
this optimal point, competitors became overconfident, picked more 
fights, and engaged in other aggressive actions that led to increased risk 
of injury or death.108 
In addition to studying how the traders’ testosterone levels varied 
with investment results, Coates examined the impact of the stress 
hormone cortisol on traders’ risk taking propensities.  In lab studies, high 
                                                                                                                       
104COATES, supra note 47, at 163.   
105John M. Coates et al., From Molecule to Market: Steroid Hormones and Financial 
Risk-Taking, 365 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC’Y. B., 331, 336 (2010). 
106Booth et al., Testosterone, and Winning and Losing in Human Competition, 23 
HORMONE BEHAV. 556 (1989).  The “winner effect” has also been observed in sports fans.  In 
one study, fans of a winning soccer team experienced higher testosterone levels, while fans of 
the losing team experienced a drop in testosterone levels. P.C. Bernhardt et al., Changes in 
Testosterone Levels During Vicarious Experiences of Winning and Losing Among Fans at 
Sporting Events, 65 PHYSIOL. BEHAV. 59 (1998); see also Coates et al., supra note 105, at 
339-40. 
107COATES, supra note 47, at 192 (“Biologists have found that the effects of 
testosterone on risk taking among animals display the same [inverted-U shaped] dose-response 
curve that we have encountered before”).  
108As Coates explains it, “[a]t low levels of testosterone an animal will lack 
motivation, arousal, energy, speed and so on, but as testosterone levels rise, so too does the 
animal’s performance in competition and fights. When testosterone reaches its highest point on 
the curve the animal enjoys optimal performance . . . However, should testosterone continue to 
rise, the animal begins to slide down the other side of the hill, and its risk taking becomes 
increasingly foolish . . . At some point, as testosterone builds up in these animals, confident 
risk taking morphs into overconfidence and rash behavior.” Id. Coates also notes similar 
effects of elevated testosterone on male athletes.  Coates, supra note 105, at 338. 
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levels of cortisol correlate with risk aversion.109   Coates found that the 
cortisol levels of traders rose during periods of stock price volatility, 
when it became difficult to predict price movements.110  He theorized 
that chronically elevated cortisol levels, which could exist during 
prolonged periods of market volatility, might interfere with rational 
decision making.  As traders’ cortisol levels rise, it could impair trading 
performance by promoting an irrational level of risk aversion.111 
Coates’s findings on the correlation between hormone levels and 
trading results become all the more intriguing when interpreted against 
the backdrop of studies in animals and humans which show that 
hormones and neurotransmitters associated with risk taking and caution 
all reach a point of diminishing returns.  At some point, the benefits 
associated with higher levels of the biomarker shift and correlate instead 
with diminished performance on physical or cognitive tasks.  For 
example, the stress hormone “cortisol displays an inverted-U shaped 
dose-response curve, according to which performance on a range of 
cognitive and behavioural tasks is optimized at moderate levels, while 
being impaired at lower and higher levels.”112   
Just as moderate levels of cortisol correlate with optimal physical 
and cognitive performance, researchers have found the same inverted-U 
shaped curve for testosterone and dopamine, both of which are 
associated with competition, aggression, risk-taking, and other forms of 
reward seeking behavior.113  Taken together, this research reinforces the 
                                                                                                                       
109COATES, supra note 47, at 224; S.J. Lupien et al., The Effects of Stress Hormones on 
Human Cognition: Implications for the Field of Brain and Cognition, 65 BRAIN COGNITION 
209 (2007).  
110Coates & Herbert supra note 103, at 6169; see also Narayanan Kandasamy et al., 
Cortisol Shifts Financial Risk Preferences, 111 PNAS 3608 (2014)(reporting similar effects of 
elevated cortisol in a laboratory-based study). 
111Coates et al., supra note 105. In another study, Coates and his colleagues examined 
the second to fourth finger digit length ratio of the London traders.  Coates found that traders 
with a lower second to fourth finger digit length ratio had better performance in short term 
trading than a comparable sample. John M. Coates, Mark Gurnell & Aldo Rustichini, Second-
to-Fourth Digit Ratio Predicts Success Among High-Frequency Financial Traders, 106 PNAS 
623, 624 (2009). The second to fourth digit ratio is thought to be a biomarker for prenatal 
circulating testosterone.  Levels of prenatal testosterone have an organizing impact on the 
brain and seem to lead to advantages later in life in both physical and cognitive tasks. COATES, 
supra note 47, at 188; John Manning & R. Taylor, Second to Fourth Digit Ratio and Male 
Ability in Sport: Implications for Sexual Selection in Humans, 22 EVOLUTION HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 61 (2001).  
112Coates et al., supra note 105, at 338-39; see also Lupien et al., supra note 109. 
113See COATES, supra note 47, at 192; Sapra et al., supra note 94, at 2; Dustin 
Wahlstrom et al., Developmental Changes in Dopamine Transmission in Adolescence: 
Behavioral Implications and Issues in Assessment, 72 BRAIN AND COGNITION 146, 151 (2010) 
(“[E]vidence suggests that dopamine transmission occurs within a small window of optimal 
functioning, whereby both excessive and deficient levels of dopamine impair behavioral 
performance . . . [B]oth animal and human data indicate that the relationship between 
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notion that moderation is the key to success in investing.  Being too 
cautious (heightened cortisol) or too risk seeking (heightened 
testosterone and dopamine) can lead to mistakes.   
 
2.   Wall Street Traders 
 
Another field study of traders reinforces Coates’s finding by 
showing that genes associated with moderately high levels of dopamine 
correlated with long-term investment success.  Steve Sapra and his 
colleagues assessed the genetic profiles of long-time Wall Street traders 
working at five different financial firms.  Applying logistic regression 
analysis, they found that certain genes associated with risk taking 
correlated with investment success.114  Sapra and his colleagues focused 
on genes affecting dopamine transmission.115  They found that traders 
with a combination of genes associated with intermediate dopamine 
levels were more successful, as measured by the length of their tenure on 
Wall Street.116  
Sapra and his colleagues also assessed the personalities of the 
traders and found that successful traders “were good at integrating 
disparate pieces of information, eschewed trading in volatile markets and 
did not view the world as threatening their survival.”117  The authors 
therefore advise that it may be a mistake to focus on “risk-taking and 
competitive behaviors when hiring traders.”118  Their research suggested 
that neither taking nor avoiding risks correlates with investment success.  
Instead, “a balanced level of risk appears to be optimal.”119  
 
C.  The Wisdom of Moderation 
 
To sum up, psychologists and neuroscientists have concluded that, 
to some extent, the propensity toward risk is a stable personality trait 
determined in part by biological differences.120  Researchers have further 
determined that impulsivity, characterized by steeply discounting the 
                                                                                                                       
dopamine availability and cognitive performance is characterized by an inverted-U shaped 
function.”). 
114Sapra et al., supra note 94, at 1. 
115Id.  The researchers focused on the DRD4 gene, the MOA-A gene, and the COMT 
gene, which produces an enzyme that breaks down dopamine.   
116Id. at 5.  A combination of the LL variant of the DRD4P gene and the high activity 
COMT gene correlated with greater longevity in the profession. 
117Id. at 6. 
118Id. 
119Id. 
120See Odum, supra note 62, at 7 (assessing the evidence of impulsivity as a stable 
personality trait). 
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long term costs and benefits of a decision, correlates with a propensity 
for antisocial risk.  Several studies link risky choices in lab settings with 
problematic behavior such as compulsive gambling and substance abuse.  
Furthermore, researchers have identified genes that correlate with 
alcohol abuse, problem gambling, and other forms of impulsive novelty-
seeking behavior.121  One of these genes, the 7-repeat allele of DRD4 
gene, also correlates with financial risk taking in lab settings.122   
These investigations into the neurological mechanisms behind 
financial decision-making suggest that moderation and flexibility are the 
keys to investment success.  The genes and endogenous hormones 
associated with risk-taking, openness, and caution all eventually reach a 
point of diminishing returns where the favored or adaptive trait becomes 
dysfunctional.  That is, testosterone, dopamine, and cortisol all have an 
inverted-U shaped relationship with skills and traits that correlate with 
investment success and, more broadly, success in competitive 
endeavors.123  
These findings comport with common sense.  We are all aware 
that boldness, brashness, and drive can help a person get ahead, but such 
qualities can lead to trouble if not balanced by cognitive flexibility, the 
ability to shift gears, the capacity for introspection, and a measure of 
self-control.124  To date, the bulk of research in economic neuroscience 
suggests that a successful investor must be willing to embrace risk, but 
must be equally cognizant of the need to pull away.  Success requires not 
only a willingness to take risks, but the ability to remain alert to new 
stimuli and change course quickly in response to new or discordant 
information.  In short, being excessively risk seeking or excessively 




                                                                                                                       
121Kuhnen & Chiao, supra note 70, at 3 (describing the relationship between genetics 
and novelty-seeking behavior). 
122Id.; Sapra et al., supra note 94, at 2. 
123Sapra et al., supra note 94, at 2 (“levels of synaptic dopamine have an inverted-U 
relationship with several cognitive abilities as shown by both animal and human data”); 
COATES, supra note 47, at 189 (testosterone); Lupien, supra note 109, at 220 (cortisol). 
124See Langevoort, supra note 17, at 302-03 (“What is sought [in corporate 
executives], presumably, is some element of balance and self-discipline”). 
125Kuhnen & Knutson, supra note 92, at 767 (“financial decision making may require 
a delicate balance - recruitment of distinct circuits may be necessary for taking or avoiding 
risks, but excessive activation of one mechanism or the other may lead to mistakes.”); Sapra et 
al., supra note 94, at 6 (“Having too little or too much risk-aversion is not associated with 
success by those in our sample; rather taking a balanced level of risk appears to be optimal.”). 
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IV. CORPORATE LEADERSHIP AND RISK 
 
A.  Risk and Personality 
 
Thus far, we have seen that individual attitudes toward risk vary, 
and that one’s approach to risk seems to influence the quality of one’s 
decisions. For example, antisocial risk takers perform sub-optimally on 
decision-making tasks when compared to controls.126  Antisocial risk 
seekers are also more prone to engage in illegal or unethical behavior.  
One study that assessed the personalities of different categories of risk 
takers found that antisocial risk takers (represented by substance abusers) 
had higher scores for psychopathy - an antisocial personality dimension - 
than the heroic or adventurous risk takers who participated in the 
study.127  In another study, college students with elevated scores for 
antisocial/impulsive traits had heightened brain responses both to 
stimulant drugs and to the opportunity to win financial rewards in a lab-
administered task.128   
Conventional corporate law theory maintains that corporate hiring 
and promotion practices will filter out persistently irrational individuals 
before they can cause significant harm to their firms.  Despite this 
conventional belief, research suggests that the business world offers an 
attractive environment for individuals with a high level of antisocial 
traits.  Numerous studies have found, for example, that business students 
are less pro-socially oriented than peers studying in other fields and 
display higher levels of narcissistic traits.129  Other studies have found 
that individuals with higher economic status (a category that includes 
                                                                                                                       
126See supra text at notes 53-61. 
127See Levenson, supra note 52, at 1074, 1078.  In the study, pro-social risk takers 
were represented by public servants who had been recognized for heroic action in the line of 
duty.  Adventurous risk takers were represented by recreational rock climbers who had 
achieved a high level of skill and antisocial risk takers were represented by substance abusers 
who had been convicted of serious crimes and were in residential treatment at the time.  
128Buckholtz et al., supra note  69, at 420. 
129See Stephan Meier & Bruno S. Frey, Do Business Students Make Good Citizens? 11 
INTL. J. ECON. BUS. 141, 141-42 (2004); Lennart Sjoberg & Elisabeth Engelberg, Attitudes to 
Economic Risk Taking, Sensation Seeking and Values of Business Students Specializing in 
Finance, 10 J. BEHAV. FIN. 32, 40 (2009) (finding finance students in Sweden were “high in 
economic risk taking and gambling, low in money importance and concern, high in sensation 
seeking and success orientation, relatively high in emotional intelligence in comparison with 
other students, and low in altruistic values.”); W. Keith Campbell et al., Narcissism in 
Organizational Contexts, 21 HUMAN RES. MGT. REV. 268, 273 (2011) (citing studies finding 
that business majors are characterized by a higher level of narcissism than their fellow 
students). 
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most business executives) behave less ethically in a range of contexts 
than those with a lower social stature.130  
More pointedly, surveys of financial professionals reveal the 
common perception that illegal or unethical activity is rampant in their 
field.131  In these surveys, a significant percentage of employees working 
at financial firms reported witnessing or having firsthand knowledge of 
illegal or unethical conduct.132  A significant percentage also believed 
that unethical conduct is sometimes necessary for success in the field.133  
This attitude extended to high-level executives.  For example, more than 
half of those surveyed earning at least $500,000 annually reported 
believing “it [is] likely that their competitors have engaged in unethical 
or illegal activity in order to gain an edge in the market.”134 
Taken together, research on the attitudes and behavior of both 
aspiring corporate executives and financial professionals challenges the 
core assumptions of rational actor theory.  It suggests that many 
corporate executives may be more prone to reckless risk taking than 
rational actor theory predicts. Additional research lends credence to these 
suspicions by documenting the presence of individuals with antisocial 
tendencies at high levels of corporate management, and linking these 
troubling personality traits to high-risk corporate strategies and fraud. 
 
B.  CEO Personality and Fraud 
 
Recently, scholars have theorized that CEO personality was a 
contributing factor in major corporate frauds.135  Accounts of the 
                                                                                                                       
130Paul K. Piff et al., Higher Social Class Predicts Increased Unethical Behavior, 109 
PNAS 4086, 4086 (2012) (describing seven studies finding that upper-class individuals 
behaved more unethically than lower-class individuals in contexts including driving, taking 
goods from others, lying, cheating to win a prize, and behaving unethically at work). 
131See University of Notre Dame & Labaton & Sucharow LLP, The Street, The Bull 
and The Crisis, A Survey of the US and UK Financial Services Industry (May 25, 2015); 
Labaton Sucharow LLP, Wall Street Fleet Street Main Street, Corporate Integrity at a 
Crossroads: United States & United Kingdom Financial Services Industry Survey (July 2012). 
132Notre Dame & Labaton Sucharow, supra note 131, at 3 (“More than one-third 
(34%) of those earning $500,000 or more annually have witnessed or have first hand 
knowledge of wrongdoing in the workplace.”). 
133Id. 
134Id. 
135See, Barnard, supra note 17, at 423; Grace Duffield & Peter Grabowsky, The 
Psychology of Fraud, TRENDS AND ISSUES IN CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2001); Frank S. 
Perri, White Collar Criminals:  The “Kinder, Gentler” Offender?, 8 J. INVESTIG. PSYCH. 
OFFENDER PROFIL. 217, 223 (2011); see also Jayne W. Barnard, Shirking, Opportunism, Self-
Delusion and More:  The Agency Problem Lives On, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 747 
(2013) (discussing the possible role of CEO psychopathy in corporate frauds); Clive R. Boddy, 
The Corporate Psychopaths Theory of the Global Financial Crisis, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 255, 
256 (2011). 
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personal conduct of CEOs of firms involved in scandal lead theorists to 
focus on narcissism and psychopathy as personality traits most likely to 
contribute to corporate fraud.136 Psychopathy and narcissism are related 
personality traits, which at extreme levels constitute personality 
disorders.  The two personality profiles share commonalities which, 
theoretically, if present in corporate managers should be damaging to 
corporations and their stakeholders.137  
It is not surprising, therefore, that researchers in a range of fields 
have explored the relationship between these destructive personality 
traits and corporate mismanagement and fraud.  This research establishes 
that some psychopaths work for major corporations, and may be 
represented at higher levels in corporate management than among the 
general population.  In fact, a study of British executives found the 
incidence of personality traits related to the emotional dimensions of 
psychopathy matched or exceeded the incidence of the same traits in a 
sample of individuals incarcerated as criminally insane. 
Although there is less direct evidence of the extent to which 
narcissism exists among senior corporate executives, many management 
scholars posit that narcissism is a prevalent trait among corporate 
managers and could even be a necessary quality for success.138  To test 
this hypothesis, several scholars have constructed proxies for CEO 
narcissism based on publicly available information.  Their studies 
conclude that CEO narcissism, as measured by these proxies, correlates 
with high-risk decisions, performance volatility, and accounting fraud. 
 
1. Corporate Psychopathy 
 
In the public mind, psychopathy is associated with violent 
criminals like the serial killer Ted Bundy or fictional characters from 
psychological thrillers like Silence of the Lambs.139  Corporate theorists 
tend to presume that a psychopath could never occupy an important 
                                                                                                                       
136Antionette Rijsenbilt & Harry Commandeur, Narcissus Enters the Courtroom: CEO 
Narcissism and Fraud, 117 J. BUS. ETHICS 413, 427 (2013) (finding a “positive statistically 
significant relationship between CEO narcissism and the occurrence of fraud.”); Campbell et 
al., supra note 129, at 272 (“The list of powerful CEOs that allegedly have fit the ‘narcissistic 
profile’ is long:  Jack Welch, Michael Eisner, Larry Ellison, and Bob Nardelli have all been 
labeled narcissistic CEOs by the popular business press.”).  
137See Babiak et al., supra note 31, at 192.  
138See Michael Maccoby, Narcissistic Leaders, The Incredible Pros the Inevitable 
Cons, 78 HARV. BUS. REV. 68 (2000); see also MICHAEL MACCOBY, NARCISSISTIC LEADERS:  
WHO SUCCEEDS AND WHO FAILS 6-7 (2007) (discussing the benefits of narcissistic 
personality traits for innovative corporate leadership). 
139Babiak et al., supra note 31, at 174 (noting popular view that “psychopathy equates 
to criminality and violence”). 
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position at a major corporation.140  This assumption is likely incorrect 
because a psychopath often possesses many seemingly admirable traits, 
such as charm, assertiveness, and boldness, that mask his destructive 
qualities.141  These personal qualities and the impression they create can 
be employed to forge an image as a leader that might prevent corporate 
officials from recognizing the “monster” in their midst before it’s too 
late.142 
A psychopath is a person who lacks a conscience, shows no 
remorse, and acts only in his self-interest without regard for the impact 
of his actions on others.143  The psychopath lacks empathy, is deceitful, 
manipulative, and indifferent to the feelings of others.  These troubling 
traits are often accompanied by superficial charm that allows the 
psychopath to mask his moral vacuity.  
The most reliable diagnostic tool for psychopathy is the 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R).144  In the PCL-R, a trained 
clinician rates a subject for 20 traits based on an interview and a review 
of his criminal record, as well as employment and relationship history.  
Traits assessed on the PCL-R include: superficiality, grandiosity, 
deceitfulness, a lifestyle characterized by impulsivity, lack of direction, 
and irresponsibility, lack of remorse and empathy, failure to take 
responsibility for one’s actions, a history of poor behavior controls, and 
antisocial activities (crime, drugs, disciplinary problems, or other 
behavior that falls outside of accepted societal norms) as an adolescent 
and adult.  A subject is assigned 0, 1, or 2 points for each of the traits 
                                                                                                                       
140See Langevoort, supra note 17, at 302 (“Anecdotal observation and common sense, 
however, make it fairly implausible that the pure egoist, much less the sociopath, is likely to 
rise to the top of an organization.”). 
141RONALD SCHOUTEN & JAMES SILVER, ALMOST A PSYCHOPATH, DO I (OR DOES 
SOMEONE I KNOW) HAVE A PROBLEM WITH MANIPULATION AND LACK OF EMPATHY 24-25 
(2012); Boddy, supra note 135, at 257 (citing research showing psychopaths are found at 
greater levels of incidence at senior levels of organizations than at junior levels). 
142See Boddy, supra note 135, at 256 (“Although they may look smooth, charming, 
sophisticated, and successful, Corporate Psychopaths should theoretically be almost wholly 
destructive to the organizations they work for.”); Amanda Gudmundsson & Gregory Southey, 
Leadership and the Rise of the Corporate Psychopath: What Business Schools can Do about 
the “Snakes Inside?”, 2 E-JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIOURAL RESEARCH IN BUSINESS 
18, 19 (2011) (“some leadership styles share traits commonly imbued with psychopathic 
behaviour”).  
143BABIAK & HARE, supra note 34, at 19.  Some scholars have noted similarities 
between a psychopath and the rational actor, or homo economicus, of neoclassical economics. 
See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 17, at 45-47. 
144BABIAK & HARE, supra note 34, at 25.  Psychiatry’s official analog for psychopathy 
is Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD).  APD differs from psychopathy because the 
diagnosis depends more on the behavioral conduct components of anti-social behavior, rather 
than the emotional affective components of psychopathy. See id. at 18-19. 
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assessed.  The maximum rating a person can receive is 40 points – two 
points for each of the 20 items assessed.  
A PCL-R score of 30 or higher is the threshold for a clinical 
diagnosis of psychopathy.  However, psychologists do not view 
psychopathy as an all-or -nothing proposition.  Instead, psychologists 
view psychopathy as existing on a continuum.145  Those who fall in the 
middle of the psychopathy scale, while not clinical psychopaths, still 
have the capacity to cause grave harm to friends, family members, and 
their employers.146  A discrete category of psychopaths, dubbed 
“successful” psychopaths, manage to live their lives with apparent 
success and little contact with the criminal justice system.147  The 
“successful” psychopath is typically more intelligent than those who get 
caught up in the criminal justice system and is able to use his intelligence 
to blend into society and avoid getting caught for any major moral or 
legal transgressions.148 
Several methodological challenges impede the study of negative 
personality traits among corporate employees, limiting our understanding 
of how such traits might impact corporate policies or performance.149  
Corporations are understandably reluctant to be identified as employing 
people with serious psychological problems.150  Corporate executives are 
also extremely busy, making it difficult to recruit them to participate in 
psychological studies.  Despite these challenges, resourceful researchers 
                                                                                                                       
145SCHOUTEN & SILVER, supra note 141, at 57-59. Experts estimate that about 1% of 
Americans fit the clinical profile for psychopathy and that psychopaths comprise about 15% of 
the prison population.  
146Id. (reporting that an estimated 5%-15% of general population are “subclinical” 
psychopaths, people who would score somewhere between the 25th and 75th percentile on PCL-
R scale).  
147Gudmundsson & Southey, supra note 142, at 22 (“A successful psychopath is 
defined as an individual who presents a sub-clinical manifestation of psychopathic traits, who 
has not been incarcerated in the judicial or mental health systems, and is more likely to engage 
in manipulative and antisocial behaviour”); S. Gustafson & D. Ritzer, The Dark Side of 
Normal: A Psychopathy-Linked Pattern Called Aberrant Self-Promotion, 9 EUROPEAN J. 
PERS. 147, 148 (1995); T. Pethman & S. Erlandsson, Aberrant Self-Promotion or Subclinical 
Psychopathy in Swedish General Population 53 PSYCHOL. RECORD 33 (2003); SCHOUTEN & 
SILVER, supra note 141, at 57.  ZUCKERMAN, supra note 53, at 258. 
148Board & Fritzon, supra note 32, at 19 (observing that studies of “successful” 
psychopaths suggest that the “emotional” factor of psychopathy is more pronounced than the 
“antisocial” dimension when compared to those psychopaths who get into trouble with the 
law.”).   
149Babiak et al., supra note 31, at 175 (“[W]e know little about ‘corporate 
psychopathy’ and its implications, in large part because of the difficulty in obtaining the active 
cooperation of business organizations and their personnel for research purposes.”). 
150Id. at 176 (“organizations are often reluctant to use measures of psychopathology 
except under special circumstances”). 
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have made important strides in discerning the extent to which certain 
personality problems exist among corporate managers.   
Two major studies have found that individuals with psychopathic 
personalities may be over-represented, relative to the general population, 
at higher levels of U.S. and multinational corporations.  In a well-known 
study, psychologists Paul Babiak, Craig Neumann, and Robert Hare 
examined the personnel records of more than 200 managers at seven 
large American corporations.151  They found that approximately 4% of 
the individuals in the group met the clinical criteria for psychopathy.152  
This is four times higher than the estimated 1% of the general population 
that meets the same criteria.  Some of the managers with high 
psychopathy scores held senior positions at their firms.153   
Despite the common assumption that high levels of psychopathy 
would impede one’s professional progress, Babiak and his colleagues 
found that high scores for psychopathy correlated with many positive 
perceptions of an individual’s job performance.  In performance reviews 
by peers and superiors, high scorers for psychopathy earned high ratings 
for “communication skills, strategic thinking, and creative/innovative 
ability.”154  These intangible qualities are often associated with 
leadership, innovation, and vision, which are rare but prized attributes for 
corporate leadership.155  
 A study by Professors Belinda Jane Board and Katerina Fritzon 
assessed the personalities of 39 senior British business executives based 
on self-administered psychological questionnaires.156  The researchers 
compared the personality profiles of these executives with those of a 
group of psychiatric patients and mentally disordered criminals.  They 
found a higher prevalence of three personality disorder traits among the 
                                                                                                                       
151Id. at 178-79. 
152Id. at 183.  Babiak and his colleagues found that 3.9% of the 203 individuals in the 
sample studied met the clinical definition for psychopathy, with PCL-R scores of 30 or more.  
In addition, 4.4% scored 25 or higher, which, while subclinical, is still a cause for concern. 
When rated on the PCL-SV (a screening survey designed for use with the general population), 
5.9% of the sample scored 13 or higher indicating “potential” or “possible” psychopathy. Id. at 
183-84.  This is about five times higher than the 1.2% of a general community sample that 
scored 13 or above on the PCL-SV. 
153Id. at 185; Boddy, supra note 135, at 257 (noting that psychopaths in firms “may be 
singled out for promotion because of their polish, charm, and cool decisiveness.”). 
154Babiak et al., supra note 31, at 189. 
155Id. at 190-91.  As the authors explain, “It is easy to mistake psychopathic traits for 
specific leadership traits. For example, charm and grandiosity can be mistaken for self-
confidence or a charismatic leadership style; likewise, good presentation, communications, and 
impression management skills reinforce the same picture” and “the psychopath’s ability to 
manipulate can look like good influence and persuasion skills, the mark of an effective leader.”  
156Board & Fritzon, supra note 32, at 20. 
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business executives when compared to the criminally insane.157  
Specifically, the business executives were more likely than the clinical 
and prison populations to exhibit histrionic traits and were statistically as 
likely to exhibit high levels of traits consistent with narcissism and 
obsessive compulsive disorder.158  The problematic personality traits 
evident in the business executive sample align with the emotional 
components of psychopathy and are consistent with the findings from 
Babiak’s studies of American corporate managers.159 
Because of the small sample sizes in these studies, we cannot 
assume their results represent the general population of corporate 
managers.  Still, it seems reasonable to conclude based on these studies 
that some psychopaths manage to thrive within corporate America.  It is 
easy to understand why individuals with psychopathic traits would be 
attracted to the business world.160  The opportunity to earn large sums of 
money, the attendant power, and prestige appeal to the narcissistic and 
power hungry.161  The fast pace and relative chaos at firms experiencing 
upheaval also present opportunities for rapid progress through 
manipulation that many psychopaths find entertaining.162  As noted 
earlier, Babiak and his colleagues found that high scorers for 
psychopathy received high ratings for communication skills and other 
intangible leadership traits.163  Yet, these high scorers also received poor 
performance ratings for management style, acting as a team player, and 
poor performance appraisals from their immediate superiors.164  It thus 
appears that a psychopath’s superior “impression management” skills 
may allow him to survive in the corporate environment despite lacking 
the core competencies of an effective corporate manager.165  
The studies reviewed above show that individuals with high levels 
of psychopathic traits can survive and thrive in a corporate setting.  They 
                                                                                                                       
157Id. at 19-21. 
158Id. at 25. 
159Id. 
160BABIAK & HARE, supra note 34, at xiii, 97-98. 
161SCHOUTEN & SILVER, supra note 141, at 147 (“psychopaths are attracted to money 
and power the way sharks are attracted to chum”); Stout, supra note 13, at 555-56 (“Incentive 
schemes naturally attract the relatively opportunistic, because relatively opportunistic 
individuals see potential for personal gain that individuals who are more constrained by 
personal ethics would discount as out-of-bounds and unavailable.”).   
162Boddy, supra note 135, at 257. 
163Babiak et al., supra note 31, at 189. 
164Id.; see also Boddy, supra note 135, at 256 (observing that “corporate psychopaths 
are also poorly organized managers who adversely affect productivity and have a negative 
impact on many different areas of organizational effectiveness.”); SCHOUTEN & SILVER, supra 
note 141, at 156 (explaining that an “almost psychopath” might commit fraud or get the 
company in trouble with the government). 
165 Babiak et al., supra note 31, at 191. 
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do not, however, establish a clear link between these personality traits 
and corporate misconduct or fraud.  Despite anecdotal reports of 
workplace misconduct by individuals with high psychopathy scores, we 
know little about the direct consequences for the corporations that 
employ clinical psychopaths.166  
 A more recent study helps fill a gap in research by linking one 
form of antisocial conduct (criminal behavior) with future accounting 
fraud.  In this study, Robert Davidson and colleagues focused on a 
CEO’s prior scrapes with the law as a possible risk factor for fraud.167  
They posited that an executive’s prior legal infractions indicated 
disregard for law and low self-control, which might translate into a 
higher propensity to commit fraud in one’s professional life.168  Their 
study found a direct positive relationship between a CEO’s prior criminal 
record and the propensity to perpetrate fraud.169  
The researchers employed a dynamic hazard model to test whether 
the likelihood of accounting fraud increased during the tenure of a CEO 
with a criminal record.170  They concluded that “fraud risk is elevated in 
firms run by CEOs with a prior record and such record holders are 
significantly more likely than non-record holders to be directly involved 
in fraud.”171  The study is subject to several limitations that caution 
against drawing broad conclusions from its findings.172  Still, by 
discerning a link between a CEO’s past antisocial conduct and future 
accounting fraud, the study lends support to the theoretical proposition 
that a CEO’s personality can be a contributing factor in corporate 
fraud.173 
  
                                                                                                                       
166Id. (“[a]lthough our results suggest that psychopathic individuals get away with 
problematic behaviors, we would benefit from systematic research on the dynamics of their 
interactions with others.”). 
167Robert Davidson, et al., Executives “Off the Job” Behavior, Corporate Culture and 
Financial Reporting Risk, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2015). 
168Id. at 9. 
169Id. at 8.  The researchers created a sample of firms named for fraudulent financial 
reporting from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs).  They created a control sample of non-fraud firms, by 
matching each firm in the fraud sample with a firm with a similar business profile that was not 
cited in the AAERs.  They found that a significantly higher percentage of CEOs of fraud firms 
had criminal records when compared to the CEOs of non-fraud firms.   
170Id. at 13-15. 
171Id. at 15.  
172Limitations of the study include its small sample size and the fact that the fraud 
firms studied were limited to those that SEC had targeted for enforcement action.  In addition, 
the study was not designed to measure directly the relationship between a CEO’s personality 
and fraud. See Id. 
173Id. at 6. 
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2.  CEOs and Narcissism 
 
Although strong theoretical arguments link corporate psychopathy 
and fraud, due to methodological constraints, the empirical case is 
weaker.  Scholars have made more headway investigating the impact of a 
related personality trait - narcissism - on corporate strategy, performance, 
and the incidence of fraud.  Narcissism is a personality disorder that is 
closely related to psychopathy.174  Narcissism is defined as “a pervasive 
pattern of grandiosity, a need for admiration, a lack of empathy for 
others, and a belief that one is superior, unique, and ‘chosen.’”175  The 
diagnostic criteria for narcissistic personality disorder includes: (1) an 
exaggerated sense of self-importance, (2) preoccupation with fantasies 
about success, power, or beauty, (3) a belief that one is special and can 
associate only with equally special people, (4) a need for constant 
admiration, (5) a sense of entitlement, (6) taking advantage of others, (7) 
lack of empathy, (8) being envious of others, and (9) behaving in an 
arrogant or haughty manner.176                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
An individual who meets five or more of these criteria fits the 
diagnosis for narcissistic personality disorder.  As with psychopathy, 
psychologists view narcissism as existing on a continuum.  Those who 
exhibit lower levels of the trait may not rise to the level of a clinical 
diagnosis but can still cause considerable trouble for those around them.   
Management theorists have noted similarities between 
narcissism’s distinguishing characteristics and the character traits often 
associated with successful corporate executives.177  Although some 
theorists assert that a certain degree of narcissism is essential for CEO 
success,178 at extreme levels, a CEO’s narcissism has the capacity to 
destroy a firm.179  As previously mentioned, assessing the personality of 
                                                                                                                       
174BABIAK & HARE, supra note 34, at 41 (describing “aggressive or malignant 
narcissism which is difficult to distinguish from psychopathy”). 
175Perri, supra note 135, at 225. 
176DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS TEXT REVISION 
717 (4th ed. 2000); Campbell, et al., supra note 129, at 268.  
177Board & Fritzon, supra note 32, at 19 (“Elements of the narcissistic personality bare 
a striking resemblance to personality characteristics that have been implicated in aspects of 
organizational leadership behavior.”). 
178See Seth A. Rosenthal & Todd L. Pittinsky, Narcissistic Leadership, 17 
LEADERSHIP Q. 617 (2006); Maccoby, supra note 138, at 68.  
179Rijsenbilt & Commandeur, supra note 136, at 422. (stating that “a high level or 
narcissism can become a real problem if leaders lose contact with reality, start living in their 
own world, and cultivate hubris and an obsession for greed.”).  The authors also suggest there 
may be “an intricate relation between leadership and narcissism.  Too little narcissism can 
destroy a CEO’s effectiveness, too much can stifle a CEO’s ability and might lead to unethical 
conduct.”  Id.  
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business leaders presents several methodological challenges.180 To 
bypass these obstacles, researchers have looked to unobtrusive indicators 
of narcissism to determine if these indirect measures correlate with 
corporate financial performance or fraud. Several studies applying this 
technique have linked high levels of CEO narcissism with increased 
acquisition activity and an increased risk of accounting fraud.  
In one study, researchers assessed public indications of CEO 
narcissism (such as the use of “I” and other first person pronouns in 
media reports and the size of CEO’s photo in the annual report) to create 
a narcissism index.181  They found that CEO narcissism correlated with 
greater stock price volatility and high-risk/high profile decisions.182  The 
authors found that narcissism index scores did not correlate with better or 
worse performance.  They concluded instead that, although “narcissists 
tend to generate more extreme and irregular performance than non-
narcissists, they do not generate systematically better or worse 
performance.”183 
A similar study assessed CEO narcissism based on 15 objective 
criteria and found a positive correlation between CEO narcissism and 
accounting fraud.184  In this study, researchers constructed a narcissism 
scale that included factors such as CEO compensation, publicity and 
exposure, CEO power, and acquisition activity. 185  They matched CEOs 
of firms involved in fraud from the SEC’s AAER database and found a 
correlation between a high score on their narcissism scale and the 
incidence of corporate fraud.186 
                                                                                                                       
180See Arijit Chatterjee & Donald C. Hambrick, It’s All About Me:  Narcissistic CEOs 
and Their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance, 52 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 351, 362 (2007) 
(noting that “top executives of public companies are very reluctant to participate in survey 
research, questions about traits as sensitive as narcissism would yield especially low response 
rates and answers would be greatly influenced by social desirability bias”); Rijsenbilt & 
Commandeur, supra note 136, at 414 (noting that “key methodological problems investigating 
CEO narcissism and the difficulty in obtaining data” undermine efforts to research narcissism 
in corporate executives). 
181Chatterjee & Hambrick, supra note 180, at 363.  Indicators of narcissistic 
tendencies included: (1) the prominence of the CEO’s photograph in the company’s annual 
report; (2) the CEO’s prominence in the company’s press releases; (3) the CEO’s use of first-
person singular pronouns in interviews; (4) the CEO’s cash compensation divided by that of 
the second-highest paid executive in the firm; and (5) the CEO’s non-cash compensation 
divided by that of the second-highest-paid executive in the firm.    
182Id. at 379. 
183Id.  
184Rijsenbilt & Commandeur, supra note 136, at 427. 
185Id. at 415-418.  Other factors assessed included perquisites, power distribution, and 
acquisition behavior. 
186Id. at 422-23.  The study used data from CEOs of S&P 500 companies from 1992 to 
2008.  Two filters were applied to the data set. First, the study only used CEOs who had 
started their tenure from 1992 because this is when the most data was available.  A second 
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V. GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRRATIONAL CEO 
 
The state of knowledge on how CEO personality affects firm 
performance remains incomplete.  Nonetheless, research findings raise 
doubts regarding fundamental claims of rational actor theorists.  
Research makes clear that corporate hiring and promotion processes do 
not reliably filter out dysfunctional personalities from the corporate 
workforce.  Instead, the promotion process may select for antisocial and 
narcissistic personality traits.187  Research also suggests that CEOs who 
have had prior scrapes with law or who score highly on indirect measures 
of narcissism can have a destabilizing impact on corporate performance 
and may contribute to the incidence of accounting fraud. 
Although we do not know the precise percentage of irrational 
actors at the top of corporations, we know that, as a group, business 
leaders suffer from the same psychological afflictions that affect the 
general population.188  In addition, certain problematic personality traits 
are more prevalent in the business world than among the general 
population.  These traits, including psychopathy and narcissism, correlate 
with various forms of antisocial conduct.  
 
A.  Lessons for Regulators 
 
In light of recent searing experiences of how unethical corporate 
leaders can wreak havoc on the economy, it is time to reevaluate 
corporate governance policies premised on the rational actor model.  
Corporate governance policies should take account of the biological and 
psychological mechanisms that push some people toward irresponsible 
risk.  When we replace economists’ assumptions of perfect rationality 
with real-world evidence on the factors that influence risk related 
decisions, we can better understand why so many policies based on 
rational actor theory have not worked out as hoped.  
Although a comprehensive reassessment of corporate governance 
policy lies beyond the scope of this Article, certain policies naturally 
                                                                                                                       
filter was applied so that only data from those CEOs with tenure of more than three years was 
included.  Next, in order to analyze incidents of fraud, the study examined AAERs published 
by the SEC.  If an S&P company appeared in an AAER, it was reviewed to determine when 
the fraud took place and if it overlapped with a CEO from the sample described above.  The 
study examined a total of 113 relevant AAERs related to 54 CEOs from the sample.  Finally, 
the study examined whether the CEO was involved in the fraud incident identified in the 
AAERs.   
187See infra text at notes 197-99. 
188See Barnard, supra note 17, at 405-10 (summarizing psychological problems that 
sometimes plague CEOs). 
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come into question when we set aside the notion that only a rational actor 
could occupy the executive suite.  Corporate governance policies that 
promote risk taking and self-serving behavior present several dangers for 
corporations and society.189  Over time, governance policies that 
encourage or abide antisocial risk taking could have a deleterious impact 
on corporate culture.  
Not only might the raw appeal to self-interest attract individuals 
with antisocial tendencies to corporations, policies that promote the 
singular focus on self-interest may also contribute to a corporate 
environment that exacerbates such attitudes and at the same time drive 
away those with a more moderate approach to risk.190  The presence of 
antisocial personalities at high ranks in the corporate workforce means 
that corporate law must do more than just encourage risk taking.  The 
law must also seek to constrain irresponsible risk.  
 Rational actor theorists frequently assert that policymakers can 
harness the disciplinary effect of markets to encourage optimal corporate 
behavior.  These theorists focus on incentive compensation and 
competitive employment markets as mechanisms that ensure that only 
the most capable individuals will assume the helm at major corporations.  
Our improved understanding of the brain mechanisms underlying risk-
related decision-making cast doubt on the accuracy of such assertions. 
1.  The False Promise of Stock Options and Incentive-Based Pay 
 
Research on how individuals respond to reward related cues 
provides reasons to worry that incentive compensation programs may 
contribute to excessive risk taking instead of encouraging a responsible 
approach to risk.  For decades, corporate governance theorists have 
maintained that compensating corporate executives with stock or stock 
options would better align managers’ interests with those of investors.191  
                                                                                                                       
189See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate 
Governance, 37 J. CORP L. 264 (2011); Stout, supra note 13, at 553-57 (explaining how 
incentive compensation policies can crowd out prosocial behavior and attract antisocial and 
unethical employees); Cynthia A. Williams, Book Review, Icarus on Steroids, 94 GEO. L. J. 
1197 (2006). 
190See Cialdini et al., supra note 35, at 68-70 (noting “policies that promote dishonest 
business practices are likely to drive the most productive workers into the offices of more 
honest competitors where those individuals can find greater job satisfaction and be more at 
ease with their work environments.”); STOUT, supra note 17, at 169-71; Donald C. 
Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeepers Guide to the 
Psychology, Culture and Ethics of Financial Risk, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1239 (2011) 
(“The danger point comes when a long enough time passes without the firm and its people 
being called out on their self-deception, because during that time the culture feeds on itself, 
and people rise up the ranks who are its exemplars and cheerleaders and who are risk-takers 
too.”); Stout, supra note 13, at 529. 
191See Alces & Galle, supra note 12, at 58. 
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The widespread embrace of this pay for performance model triggered a 
skyrocketing in levels of executive pay.192  
Many commentators have since concluded that incentive 
compensation programs do a poor job of aligning managers’ interests 
with those of shareholders, other investors, and society.193  After the 
2008 financial crisis, some scholars argued, for example, that equity 
compensation schemes have the perverse effect of encouraging 
executives of financial firms to take excessive risks.  They, therefore, 
recommended adjustments to compensation practices to tamp down the 
risk preferences of these executives.194  Rather than rejecting the rational 
actor framework, these new approaches merely seek to calibrate the 
incentive compensation “instrument,” to better align managers’ interests 
with the long-term interests of shareholders, creditors, and society.  
Because these scholars continue to adhere to the strictures of rational 
actor analysis, their remedies are likely to miss the mark.   
Neuroscience research on how we respond to reward related cues 
suggests that tinkering with incentive pay structures is unlikely to lead to 
better results than more traditional pay-for-performance models.  
Neuroimaging studies show, for example, that our brains respond to the 
opportunity to win financial rewards the same way we respond to 
addictive substances such as sugar and cocaine.  Stock options and 
securities trading offer employees the opportunity to win financial 
rewards in conditions of uncertainty and may activate a similar brain 
response as addictive substances.  
If stock options and trading have addictive qualities, we cannot 
expect performance-based pay to motivate consistently responsible 
decision-making. Incentive compensation may motivate risk taking for 
its own sake, even when such risks become irrational.  As John Coates 
explains it, “like an addict who quickly habituates to a given dose of a 
drug and has to continually increase the hit, traders too may habituate to 
certain levels of risk and profit and be irresistibly compelled to put up 
                                                                                                                       
192From 1992 to 2000 average pay of CEO’s quadrupled from $3.5 million to $14.7 
million.  The ratio of CEO pay to average worker pay also spiked precipitously from 140 times 
average worker’s pay in 1991 to 500 times by 2003. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, 
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1 
(2004). 
193See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: 
Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. REG. 359 (2009); Lucian A. Bebchuk 
& Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 (2010); DAVID SKEEL, 
ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND 
WHERE THEY CAME FROM 152-54 (2005); Fredrick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: 
Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. Rev. 435 (2010).  
194See Alces & Galle, supra note 12, at 57-63 (reviewing literature). 
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their position size beyond what would normally be considered 
prudent.”195 
 Thus, far from offering a model “set it and forget it” policy, the 
prevalence of incentive compensation schemes creates a need for more 
rigorous external and internal constraints on risk.  Directors and 
policymakers should remain mindful that incentive pay programs can 
induce individuals to take excessive risks.196  The more heavily a firm 
relies on incentive compensation to motivate executives, the more 
vigorously it should monitor its executives for indications of reckless risk 
taking.  
  
2. The False Comfort of the Tournament Hypothesis 
 
Neuroscience findings present challenges to another theoretical 
proposition at the center of rational actor theory.  Theorists often argue 
that the tournament for corporate talent resolves most problems raised by 
those who question their assumptions regarding the rationality of 
corporate executives.197  As Professor Langevoort summarizes the 
argument, high-level corporate executives “are not randomly drawn from 
the general population.  Rather, they are survivors of high pressure 
employment and promotion tournaments that almost always took a 
significant degree of cognitive skill to win.”198  According to this 
argument, irrational individuals will be weeded out in the tournament 
process before they reach the top of their organizations.199   
Unfortunately, both anecdotal evidence and field research suggest 
that promotion tournaments select personality traits that are not 
necessarily conducive to effective management, including 
                                                                                                                       
195COATES, supra note 47, at 151. 
196See Marcia Millon Cornett, et al., Corporate Governance and Earnings 
Management at Large U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 15 J. CORP. FIN. 412, 413 (2009) 
(noting links between incentive compensation, earnings management and corporate 
governance structures at bank holding companies). 
197See, e.g., Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1570-71 (1998) (noting that “people are not randomly sorted to jobs and 
other activities” and surmising for example that “hyperbolic discounters will avoid the 
financial-services industry.”); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Big Law and Risk Management: 
Case Studies of Litigation, Deals, and Diversity, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 991, 1001-02 
(2011); see also Chip Heath, et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can 
Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. ON ORG. BEHAV. 1, 20-23 (1998) (asserting 
that organizational practices can correct for shortcomings in individual decision making). 
198Langevoort, supra note 8, at 443-44. 
199Langevoort, supra note 17, at 288 (“invoking psychological traits makes the 
orthodox corporate scholars queasy for a variety of well-mooted reasons, including their 
contingent, soft, hard-to-model properties and the economists' natural suspicion that cognitive 
weaknesses are weeded out in the crucible of corporate competition and thus trivial”). 
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overconfidence, self-promotion, and narcissism.200  A highly competitive 
tournament culture likely encourages aggression and discourages 
cooperation, factors that could contribute to the winnowing of ethical, 
prosocially-oriented employees.201  As discussed earlier, research 
suggests the existence of a “winner effect” in competition, where 
winners experience an increase in testosterone, which translates into 
increased confidence and increased risk-taking and future victories.202  
Eventually, however, the “winner effect” turns sour – as increasing levels 
of testosterone lead to overconfidence, hyper-aggression, and 
recklessness.203  
 
B.   Lessons for Corporate Officials 
 
The theoretical proposition that irrational risk seekers could thrive 
and reach the top of major corporations is borne out by research showing 
that some individuals with personality disorders occupy senior corporate 
management positions. 204  The research reviewed in this Article suggests 
there could be value in identifying behavior or personality traits among 
CEOs and senior executives that correlate with fraud.  This kind of 
information could be helpful to auditors who have to determine the scope 
and depth of audits.  Corporate directors and law enforcement officials 
could also benefit from incorporating this research in their oversight of 
corporations and their managers.  Such information could be useful when 
hiring and supervising managers and in designing compensation 
structures and corporate internal controls. Public enforcement officials 
should also apply such insights when setting law enforcement policies 




                                                                                                                       
200BABIAK & HARE, supra note 34, at xx-xiii (explaining why psychopathic 
individuals may appear to be desirable job candidates); Langevoort, supra note 17, at 288 
(“traits such as over-optimism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy, and a deep capacity for 
ethical self-deception are favored in corporate promotion tournaments so that people who 
possess them are disproportionately represented in executive suites.”). 
201Accounts of the rank and yank performance evaluation system used at major US 
firms including GE, Sunbeam and Enron suggest that such programs create an atmosphere of 
tension and chaos where antisocial risk seekers are likely to thrive.  See, e.g., MIMI SWARTZ 
WITH SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON 
59-61 (2003)(describing the performance review system at the Enron’s Gas Services division). 
202See supra text at notes 106-108.  
203Id.  
204See supra text at notes 151-159. 
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1.   General Guidelines 
 
a)   Consistent hiring and promotion practices. 
 
A first step toward protecting corporations from employees with 
propensities toward reckless risk would be consistent hiring practices for 
all employees.  Firms should adhere to strict hiring protocols including 
resume verification and reference checks.205  Simply following consistent 
procedures for hiring and promoting executives should spare firms from 
the embarrassment and reputational damage that occur when high-level 
executives are exposed for resume fraud.206 More importantly, such 
measures protect firms from employing and promoting imposters and 
other individuals who are willing to lie to get ahead.207  Comprehensive 
performance evaluation systems can help prevent bad apples who 
manage to slip through the cracks from advancing in the organization.  
Experts recommend that performance assessments “focus on ethical, 
interpersonal, and various citizenship oriented behaviors,” as research 
suggests, for example, that “narcissism primarily impedes organizational 
functioning through its association with increased unethical behavior.”208 
 
b) Workplace diversity 
 
Neuroscience studies of financial traders suggest that the 
successful investor has a combination of genes associated with moderate 
levels of endogenous hormones that contribute to risk taking, 
competition, and stress.209  Research also shows that certain forms of 
risk-taking behavior, such as substance abuse and gambling problems, 
correlate with impaired decision making on the Iowa Gambling Task and 
in delay discounting studies.   
                                                                                                                       
205BABIAK & HARE, supra note 34, at 209-13. 
206Recent examples include Yahoo’s CEO Scott Thompson, who was fired when it 
came to light that he had exaggerated his academic credentials.  See Yahoo Confirms CEO is 
Out After Resume Scandal, CNNMONEY (May 14, 2012), http://tinyurl.com/cd7d2u9.  The 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences suffered similar embarrassment when its president’s 
resume fraud was exposed.  See Todd Wallach, No Record of Academy Head’s Doctoral 
Degree, BOSTON GLOBE (June 14, 2013), http://tinyurl.com/lfl2u9t; see also MICHAEL ROSS, 
ETHICS AND INTEGRITY IN LAW AND BUSINESS 15 (2011) (noting that 500,000 people falsely 
listed college degrees they did not earn and 43% of resumes had significant inaccuracies). 
207BABIAK & HARE, supra note 34, at 104-06, 213 (describing how psychopaths 
manage to infiltrate corporate organizations and noting the importance of verifying the 
education and employment of job applicants). 
208Campbell et al., supra note 129, at 280. 
209See supra text at notes 103-119. 
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A reasonable conclusion from these studies is that employers 
should seek to maintain diversity in the work force in terms of age, 
gender, and personality to ensure that extreme personality characteristics 
do not dominate in corporate decision-making.  As one example, 
testosterone levels vary greatly between men and women and between 
older and younger individuals.210  Employing traders and managers from 
a range of demographic groups could help corporations maintain a 
healthy balance of attitudes toward risk.211 
 
2. Risk-Oriented Red Flags 
  
Theory and anecdotal evidence also suggest that monitoring 
antisocial tendencies and attitudes toward risk is of paramount 
importance at the highest executive levels.  A corporation’s CEO and 
CFO make important strategic decisions and control a corporation’s 
financial reporting apparatus.  These individuals also set the ethical tone 
for the entire corporate enterprise.212  Unfortunately, research on CEO 
personality suggests that the very qualities that can compel a person to 
the top of a corporate enterprise may also threaten a corporation’s long-
term success.213  For these reasons, directors and others who make key 
hiring and promotion decisions must remain watchful for behavior that 
correlates with a dysfunctional approach to risk.214  Firms must enforce 
conduct codes consistently to discipline and weed out unethical 
employees. 
Most importantly, directors must remain focused on ensuring and 
reaffirming the personal integrity of CEOs and CFOs to ensure that 
senior executives establish high standards for conduct throughout the 
                                                                                                                       
210Coates et al., supra note 105, at 339-40. 
211Langevoort, supra note 190, at 1230; see also Irene van Staveren, The Lehman 
Sisters Hypothesis, 39 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 995, 999-1004 (2014) (assessing empirical 
evidence of gender differences in risk preferences and investment and trading performance); 
Jiekun Huang & Darren J. Kisgen, Gender and Corporate Finance: Are Male Executives 
Overconfident Relative to Female Executives?, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 822 (2013); Langevoort, 
supra note 190, at 1230 (noting the possible influence of testosterone levels in dysfunctional 
trading behavior). 
212Cialdini et al., supra note 35, at 72 (“the effort must begin at the top, with senior 
executives setting the right example and then implementing policies to encourage the same 
behavior”). 
213See Mark Stein, When Does Narcissistic Leadership Become Problematic? Dick 
Fuld at Lehman Brothers, 22 J. MGMT. INQ. 282, 283-84 (2013) (theorizing that the same 
personality traits that help contribute to successful corporate leadership can become 
problematic when economic environment shifts). 
214As previously mentioned, individuals who suffer from substance abuse, personality 
disorders, or other forms of mental illness consistently perform poorly on basic decision 
making tasks.  Mukherjee & Kable, supra note 61. 
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organization.215 Directors and corporate managers should remain alert to 
behavioral problems among executives that suggest a struggle with 
impulsivity.  When faced with reports of discordant conduct by senior 
executives, directors should pause and evaluate all available information 
and take steps necessary to affirm their confidence in the personal 
integrity of the officer.216  In some cases, coaching or remedial action 
may be necessary.  In other cases, depending on what directors learn, 
termination of employment may be the only appropriate step.  
Anecdotal reports from recent corporate scandals point to broad 
categories of problematic executive conduct that often becomes evident 
to employees, directors, and outside observers before fraud or 
mismanagement at the relevant corporation is publicly revealed.  
Problematic executive behaviors that seem to correlate with fraud 
include substance abuse, improper workplace relationships, illegal 
conduct, and problem gambling.   
 
a) Substance abuse. 
 
In the public mind, substance abuse is associated with crime and 
social failure.  However, substance abuse problems also plague elite 
professions such as medicine and law.  Professional associations and 
licensing authorities have found that substance abuse contributes to 
professional malpractice, creating a risk of serious physical or financial 
harm for the addict’s patients or clients.  The scourge of substance abuse 
has led professional associations to establish structured programs to 
address it.217  These programs are designed to address substance abuse in 
its early stages to prevent client harm and provide guidelines for 
suspending impaired professionals, encouraging their rehabilitation, and 
monitoring and supervising individuals who are able to return to practice. 
Although there is little hard data available, anecdotal accounts 
suggest that substance abuse problems also plague the corporate and 
financial sectors.218  Journalists’ investigations and a few public trials 
                                                                                                                       
215See LESLIE S. PRATCH, LOOKS GOOD ON PAPER? 80-81 (2014) (noting the 
importance of integrity in business leadership). 
216See, e.g., David F. Larker & Brian Tayan, Scoundrels in the C-Suite: How Should 
the Board Respond When a CEO’s Bad Behavior Comes to Light, (May 10, 2016), 
http://tinyurl.com/lyxakwb. 
217See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, A Word of Caution for Lawyer Assistance 
Programming, 18 GEO. J. L. ETHICS 237, 237 (2004) (discussing bar sponsored lawyer 
substance abuse assistance programs). 
218See, e.g., Drugs and Today’s Wall Street, NYTIMES.COM (Dec. 21, 2007), 
http://tinyurl.com/lu66lwb; Wall Street Drug Use:  Employees Giving Up Cocaine for Pot and 
Pills, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2010), http://tinyurl.com/kyllwo8 (reporting that a drug rehab 
facility in Pennsylvania “has been crammed with Wall Street refugees in recent months” and 
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reveal that some of the senior executives of firms brought down by 
scandal used illegal drugs.  For example, Scott Sullivan admitted that he 
used cocaine on numerous occasions while serving as WorldCom’s 
CFO—often with fellow WorldCom employees.219  Sullivan was also 
convicted of drunk driving in 1984, a fact he hid from regulators and 
investors.220  Bear Stearns CEO James Cayne reportedly smoked 
marijuana frequently in public, often in front of other Bear Stearns 
employees.221 
More broadly, press reports have documented the prevalence of 
cocaine and other forms of substance abuse among Wall Street traders 
and executives.222  Despite widespread reports of drug use on Wall 
Street, neither Wall Street firms nor their regulators seem to have 
focused much attention on the problem.  This lack of attention to 
substance abuse in the financial industry is troubling, considering that 
traders and financial managers have fiduciary responsibilities for large 
sums of other people’s money.  
As discussed earlier, research establishes that alcohol and drug 
addiction correlate with traits such as hyperbolic delay discounting that 
could lead to irresponsible trading and investment decisions.  Substance 
abusers and gambling addicts have higher discount rates, meaning they 
prefer immediate gains to long-term rewards and prefer avoiding small 
immediate losses to averting long term catastrophic losses.223  
                                                                                                                       
“Investment bankers [. . .] are highly prone to addiction [. . .]  And there’s a lot of denial 
among employers.”).  See also Melena Ryzik, Cocaine: Hidden in Plain Sight, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 10, 2007), http://tinyurl.com/lc2uqoc (“With Wall Street surging and a 24-hour global 
economy, young professionals have the money and the incentive to stay constantly wired.”); 
Barnard, supra note 17, at 407. 
219Robert Gearty, Drugs, Coffee at WorldCom, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 8, 2005), 
http://tinyurl.com/kdqsjd8 (reporting Sullivan admitted to using cocaine and marijuana for 
several years while he worked at WorldCom including at times with other WorldCom 
employees).   
220Id.; Jayne O’Donnell & Greg Farrell, Business Scandals Prompt Look into Personal 
Lives, USATODAY.COM (Nov. 5, 2004), http://tinyurl.com/lkro4al. 
221ALAN C. GREENBERG WITH MARK SINGER, THE RISE AND FALL OF BEAR STEARNS 
164 (2010) (Bear Stearns Chairman and former CEO reporting “I knew that [Cayne] had been 
smoking pot for years.  At bridge tournaments I’d seen him do it myself.  Did I ever see him 
do it in the office? No.  Had I heard he did that? Yes.”). 
222See Alexandra Michel, Transcending Socialization: A Nine-Year Ethnography of the 
Body’s Role in Organizational Control and Knowledge Workers’ Transformation, 56 ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 325, 342 (2011) (reporting that “[b]ankers also lost bodily control in the form of 
addictions and compulsions”).  For additional anecdotal accounts, see INSIDE JOB (Sony 
Pictures Classics 2010); Charles Gasparino & Joann S. Lublin,  Citigroup's Marc Weill Left 
Firm to Battle Drug Habit,  WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2000), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB97484416768928828 (reporting on the resignation of 
Citigroup CEO Sandy Weill’s son Marc Weill for drug addiction.  At the time, the younger 
Weill was responsible for managing Citigroup’s $100 billion investment portfolio.).  
223See supra text at notes 62-66. 
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Accordingly, individuals with impulse control problems are unlikely to 
weigh the prospective costs and benefits of their decisions in the manner 
that the rational actor model predicts. 
 
b)   Improper workplace relationships. 
 
Extramarital affairs with subordinates represent another form of 
high-risk conduct by executives.  By having an affair, the executive risks 
destroying his marriage, disrupting his family, and losing the respect of 
friends and peers.224  Corporate policies toward workplace relationships 
vary, but most firms impose limits on consensual relationships between 
managers and their subordinates, as such relationships create conflicts of 
interest, raise perceptions of unfairness, and create potential legal 
liability for employers.  Despite such policies, a number of CEOs of 
firms involved in scandal engaged in inappropriate personal relationships 
at work. 
The CEOs of Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco all engaged in 
indiscreet affairs with subordinates before their firms failed, but did not 
face professional consequences for their behavior.225  These men abused 
their authority to promote their mistresses to corporate positions where 
they could help facilitate embezzlement and fraud.  For example, Tyco 
CEO Dennis Kozlowski, carried on numerous extra-marital affairs with 
employees at Tyco.  He lavished his mistresses with large bonuses and 
luxury housing and placed them in positions at Tyco where they helped 
to facilitate his unauthorized spending sprees.226   
Enron’s CEO Jeffrey Skilling had an open affair with Rebecca 
Carter, an Enron manager, whom he later married.  Skilling promoted 
Carter from a mid-level management position to the $600,000/year post 
as Corporate Secretary, a position from which she managed the executive 
team’s communications with the board of directors.227  Although in some 
                                                                                                                       
224Among the factors assessed PCL-R psychopathy test are sexual promiscuity or a 
series short-term relationships.  According to Babiak & Hare, “psychopaths have many short-
term relationships over the course of their lives . . . They often leave behind a trail of jilted 
lovers, possibly abused ex-spouses, and unsupported children”. BABIAK & HARE, supra note 
34, at 57.  See also Campbell et al. supra note 129, at 280-81 (“Narcissism predicts 
uncommitted sexual relationships, infidelity and sexual coercion, each of which has potentially 
destructive consequences in an organizational context.”). 
225BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM:  THE 
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 124-25 (2003); Simon English, 
Kozlowski’s Second Affair is Revealed to Tyco Jury, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 15, 2003), 
http://tinyurl.com/TYCO-151103; See O’Donnell & Farrell, supra note 220. 
226English, supra note 225. 
227MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 225, at 124-25.  Several other Enron executives 
were notorious for their marital infidelity.  Senior executives Ken Rice and Amanda Martin 
had an affair that began while they were both were married to other people. Id. at 124.  Lou 
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cases the corporations’ directors were aware of these improprieties, they 
failed to address the policy violations or take steps to mitigate obvious 
conflicts of interest.228 
   
c) Legal transgressions. 
 
When executives commit crimes or engage in other legal 
transgressions, it’s often just the tip of iceberg.  A criminal probe of an 
executive’s conduct outside of work often unearths evidence of 
professional misconduct.  As one example, Tyco CEO Dennis 
Kozlowski, was brought down by what started out as New York Attorney 
General Robert Morgenthau’s investigation of sales tax evasion.229  
Kozlowski shipped empty boxes from New York to New Hampshire in 
an effort to avoid paying sales tax on artwork he had purchased. After 
these charges became public and Tyco dismissed Kozlowski, the scope 
of his fraud and embezzlement at Tyco became clear. 
Along similar lines, the Wall Street Journal reported that a hotel 
guest in Boston called the police when Bear Stearns CEO James Cayne 
was smoking marijuana in the room next door.230  Although the police 
arrived at the scene, they took no action against Cayne.231  As yet another 
                                                                                                                       
Pai, director of Enron’s trading operations, spent a lot of time at Houston strip clubs. Id. at 58-
59.  Pai eventually married a former stripper from one of his favorite clubs. Id. at 301.  
WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers was also a known philanderer. See O’Donnell & Farrell, 
supra note 220. 
228McLean & Elkind, supra note 225, at 124-25 (reporting that Skilling asked the 
board for permission to date Carter after the affair had begun).  More recently, the CEOs of 
Restoration Hardware, Best Buy, Hewlett Packard, and McDonnell Douglas, among others, 
were terminated due to their involvement in improper workplace relationships.  These men 
were fired not strictly because of their affairs, but for violating their firms’ conduct rules.  
Some of the executives had misused corporate funds to support or entertain their mistresses.  
Brandon Bailey, HP’s Challenge in CEO Hunt: Analysts Call for Visionary Who Can Lead 
Company in Swiftly Changing Era, San Jose Mercury News at A1 (Aug. 8, 2010), 
http://tinyurl.com/k8tgoka. Others used their authority to hire, promote, or overpay the 
employees. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Restoration Hardware Co-Chief Steps Down After An 
Inquiry, Dealbook, nytimes.com (Aug. 16, 2012), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/restoration-hardware-co-chief-steps-down-
after-an-inquiry.  These more recent reports suggest that directors may be taking more 
seriously the risks associated with tolerating rule-breaking and unethical personal behavior at 
the top of their organizations. 
229Ari Weinberg, Kozlowski Indicted on Tax Evasion, FORBES.COM (June 4, 2002), 
http://www.forbes.com/2002/06/04/0604kozlowski.html. 
230Kate Kelly, Bear CEO’s Handling of Crisis Raises Issues, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 
2007), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119387369474078336.  These events allegedly 
occurred before Massachusetts law was amended by a public referendum to reduce possession 
of small amounts of marijuana from a criminal offense to a civil offense. 
231Id; see also GREENBERG & SINGER, supra note 221, at 85-86 (Bear Stearns 
Chairman Alan Greenberg acknowledged knowing about Cayne’s drug use yet failed to take 
action, even after Kelly’s embarrassing Wall Street Journal article was published). 
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example, a documentary film, titled Inside Job, reported that New York 
prosecutors had evidence of solicitation of prostitutes and accounting 
fraud by high-level Wall Street executives.  Although the prosecutors 
pursued criminal action against the so-called “Wall Street Madam,” they 
spared her wealthy clients similar scrutiny.232 
How should directors respond when a senior corporate executive 
has a brush with the law?  At the very least the matter deserves close 
board attention as an executive’s prior scrapes with the law may 
constitute a risk factor for fraud.233  These reports of the behavior of 
CEOs of firms embroiled in legal troubles support the view that directors 
and public officials should not look away when faced with reports of 
aberrant personal behavior by business leaders.   
The point of this discussion is not to encourage witch hunts or to 
promote the personal persecution of corporate executives.  The point 
instead is that due to their positions, corporate executives should expect 
to be held to the highest standards of professionalism.  When information 
comes to light that calls into question the personal integrity of a senior 
executive, directors should take note and treat the situation as an impetus 
to consider whether the trust they have shown to the individual in 




Like substance abuse, gambling problems correlate with impaired 
decision-making. Mental health experts believe that many Wall Street 
traders are also gambling addicts.234  As one expert has observed, “the 
personality traits between the two groups are quite similar: risk taking, 
sensation seeking and action driven.”235  In the absence of careful 
monitoring of their trading activities, gambling addicts with access to 
corporate resources are capable of bringing down a firm.  Stories of 
rogue traders who destroyed some of the world’s most prestigious 
financial firms offer sobering examples of these dangers.236  If it is 
                                                                                                                       
232See INSIDE JOB (Sony Pictures Classics 2010); Ann Schecter, Rhonda Schwarz & 
Brian Ross, CEOs, Bankers Used Corporate Credit Cards for Sex, ABCNews.com, available 
at http://tinyurl.com/kb7odb. 
233See Davidson et al., supra note 167 (discussing a study linking prior legal 
infractions to financial reporting risks). 
234See Sherree Decovny, The Financial Psychopath Next Door, CFA Magazine, 
(Mar./Apr. 2012) (reporting New York psychologist Christopher Bayer’s observation that 
many Wall Street traders become compulsive gamblers). 
235When is Gambling an Addiction? N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2010) (quoting Dr. Timothy 
Fong, co-director of the Gambling Studies Program at UCLA). 
236Nick Leeson brought down Barings Bank in 1995 with 830 million pounds of 
trading losses.  See How Leeson Broke the Bank, BBCNEWS.COM (June 22, 1999), 
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possible to become “addicted” to stock trading, then policies based on 
the assumption that decisions of traders or corporate managers are guided 
by rational self-interest are potentially destructive.237  
According to neuroscience studies the anticipation of gains (which 
in a rising market is a constant feature of securities trading and stock 
option plans) produces the same dopamine surge as addictive drugs like 
cocaine and motivates risky financial decisions.238  It is reasonable to 
worry, therefore, that incentive compensation schemes that replicate the 
reward structure of gambling could induce managers to compulsively 
pursue irrational financial risks.239  This dynamic would run counter to 
the predictions of rational choice theory, which argues that incentive 
compensation motivates the kinds of decisions that shareholders and 
society prefer.240  
In addition, problem gamblers and other antisocial risk takers are 
more likely to have impaired decision making skills; meaning they have 
trouble making rational decisions regarding risk.241  Antisocial risk takers 
tend to be perseverative, make excessively risky decisions, and show a 
preference for small short-term gains at the expense of large long-term 
losses.  Because gambling addiction does not preclude success in the 
business world, and many financial traders are believed to be gambling 
addicts,242 corporate officials and policymakers can ill-afford to ignore 
research that sheds light on how conventional corporate governance 




Scientists have made great strides in unlocking the mystery of why 
some people engage in impulsive and antisocial behavior.  A growing 
body of research suggests that impulsivity is a trait, expressed through 
various forms of antisocial conduct, which is consistent across all 
domains of an individual’s life.  When we juxtapose research on 
impulsivity with accounts of the negative impact that executives with 
                                                                                                                       
http://tinyurl.com/g0hmq; UBS lost $2.3 billion through rogue trading by Kweku Adoboli.  In 
2012, JP Morgan lost $8 billion due to rogue trades by the so-called London Whale.  
See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, JPMorgan Trading Loss May Reach $9 
Billion. DEALBOOK, NYTIMES.COM (June 28, 2012), http://tinyurl.com/wb2sah.  
237Williams, supra note 189, at 1226.   
238Buckholtz et al., supra note 69, at 421. 
239Williams, supra note 189, at 1225-26 (noting executives at firms subject to SEC 
enforcement action had greater equity-based payoffs and exercised greater fractions of vested 
options than executives at non-fraud firms). 
240Jensen & Murphy, supra note 11. 
241See Mukherjee & Kable, supra note 61. 
242LINDEN, supra note 68, at 131. 
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antisocial or narcissistic traits have had on the health of their 
corporations and the economy, it becomes clear that we must reassess the 
objective of promoting risk taking which informs much of corporate law 
analysis.   
Although irrational risk aversion poses a threat to social progress, 
antisocial risk taking also poses dangers that are too severe to ignore.  
Psychology and neuroscience findings point to moderate risk taking as 
the key to corporate and investment success.  Corporate and financial law 
policies must be redesigned to reflect this age-old wisdom.  We can 
better protect ourselves from the threat posed by reckless leaders by 
paying attention to the kinds of conduct that correlate with a 
dysfunctional approach to risk.  This Article identifies several forms of 
aberrant behavior that merit close scrutiny.  In future work, I plan to 
develop further recommendations for corporate and financial regulatory 
reform.  
 
*** 
